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Preface
Early in 1956 this laboratory published a report, R-7^, by J. N.
Snyder and L. D. Fosdick "On the Use of a High Speed General Purpose Dig­
ital Computer as the Control Element in a Surveillance and Control System". 
It stands as a comprehensive text discussing all the detailed actions of 
the control program designed by J. N. Snyder and all the considerations 
which entered into that design.
For ttose people both inside and outside the Control Systems Labora­
tory who do not require a complete knowledge of the Snyder Control Pro­
gram,, this smaller R-88 is offered by the present author. It is intended 
to provide a brief description of the control program and to serve as an 
abbreviated handbook for some of the control personnel.
i
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Introduction
The original detailed proposal for the design of "An Automatic Air 
Traffic Information and Control System" (R-35> "by A. T. Nordsieck, 1953)> 
of which Cornfield is a research model, included, as its title promised, 
not merely a discussion of facilities for automatic surveillance, hut also 
for control. It was suggested at that time that, in such a system, a con­
trol computer might perform many useful functions including threat evalua­
tion, weapons assignment, and steering calculations for friendly aircraft. 
Considerations of radar data input rate to the system and communication 
bandwidth requirements within the system showed advantages in the sharing 
of logical and computational functions by three different types of com­
puters instead of being performed within a single large multi- or general- 
purpose facility. Two of these types are special purpose machines: one
for high speed data processing, the other for automatic tracking, assoc­
iation and storage of ancillary data, and clear picture generation. Taken 
together with their associated radars and communication and display equip­
ments they perform the surveillance functions of the Cornfield System. The 
control functions are handled by the third type of computer and are the 
subject of this text.
In the summer of 1955 J. N. Snyder of this laboratory undertook "to 
investigate whether or not the complex logical and decision making func­
tions involved in the overall control program can be formulated in such 
a way as to lie within the capabilities of automatic general purpose digi­
tal computers; if this be possible, to determine what fraction of the task 
can be carried out by a computer of known speed and capacity, (specifically) 
Illiac." The problem was considered to be that of formulating a number of 
rules sufficient to carry out the logical processes of control, and form­
alizing them in a program for Illiac. The success of the investigator was 
to be measured by whether control decisions could be so formalized and, 
secondarily, the degree of completeness with which such a formalization 
'would, lie within the speed and memory capability of Illiac. Whatever de­
gree of completeness was achieved would provide an estimate of the size 
and speed of an optimum control computer. The investigation culminated in 
the writing and logical testing of an actual control program and the pub­
lishing of CSL Report R-7^ by Snyder and Fosdick.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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Before we proceed to the main business of this paper, the present writer 
wishes the reader to understand that the original authors do not pretend to 
be tactical everts, that they make no claim for the logical sufficiency or 
operational suitability of the control program. The goal they set and success­
fully attained was "to demonstrate the feasibility and desirability of bring­
ing general purpose computers and general purpose computational methods to 
bear on the control problem..." It is highly recommended that the reader con­
sult R-74, if not for the detailed description, then at least for the condi­
tional remarks to be found in the introduction and conclusion.
Integration of Control with Surveillance
Cornfield is a laboratory model of an automatic traffic monitoring and 
control system for use in Naval operations at sea. In the system which it 
models, a network of radars each with its own raw data processing equipment 
supplies, via radio link, target position reports to TASC, a central spec­
ial purpose drum computer which correlates incoming reports to form tracks.
This Sorting and Tracking Computer has memory space for 1024 targets on each 
of which it can store 96 bits of information which include geographical pos­
ition, drum address, velocities and ancillary data such as track number, 
gathered from sources other than the radar report net. The ensemble of 96 
bits of information on one track is called a word.
In the intervals between incoming radar reports, and on the basis of 
stored velocities, target positions are brought up to date by smoothed ex­
trapolation every 1.5 seconds.
While accepting, storing and operating on information from radar sta­
tions, manual keysets and the automatic control system, TASC also outputs 
its stored information for distribution on a clear picture network. Seven­
ty-six of the total 96 digits stored on the magnetic drum at each address 
comprise one complete clear picture word and describe one tracked target.
One clear picture word, 76 digits in parallel, is read out from TASC every 
20 msec. While there is space for over 1000 targets on the drum, it is ex­
pected that under severe conditions only 500 or so of these will represent 
legitimate, firm tracks to be reported in the clear picture; the rest will 
be tentative tracks and noise, not firm enough for reporting. Under these 
conditions, the maximum clear picture frame time will be about 10 seconds.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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One of the important users of the clear picture is the control com­
puter which, in the Cornfield experiment, is ILLIAC. It receives the clear 
picture, word by word, in the form of electrical signals from TASC and, 
wherever possible, performs all necessary control actions relative to that 
word or track in the 20 msec before appearance of the next clear picture 
word.
Action taken by ILLIAC in the processing of any clear picture word 
may consist in the transmission of a control command to some friendly ob­
ject, while the nature of the action is indicated by symbols written back 
into TASC’s drum at the address (es) of the object (s) acted upon. Such 
a feedback link between ILLIAC and TASC completes an information exchange 
loop between the two computers and decreases the amount of memory space 
needed in ILLIAC. It also keeps human observers of the clear picture in­
formed of the actions taken by ILLIAC and provides a simple channel for man­
ual overriding or anticipating of any ILLIAC action. A skeleton diagram 
of the integrated surveillance and control systems is shown in figure 1.
General Description of Control Program
The JNS program, as it will be called in this report, is a set of in­
structions, formalized for reading into ILLIAC via punched tape, enabling 
ILLIAC to function as a control computer which performs three kinds of ser­
vices: threat evaluation, weapon assignment, and the generation of steer­
ing instructions for intercept vectoring, direction of strikes, rendezvous, 
rescue, etc. and return-to-carrier. It can control up to 128 friendly ob­
jects against hostile objects whose number is limited only by the sorting 
and tracking capacity of the surveillance system.
While the controlled objects may be ships, submarines or planes, the 
program is especially geared to provide fast, frequent, and accurate control 
information for or against high speed aircraft; slow objects such as ships, 
which have good facilities for their own control, are dealt with in a much 
less comprehensive way. This choice was made in order to use the limited 
abilities of ILLIAC to perform those functions most likely to saturate the 
abilities of control personnel. Furthermore, a certain amount of arithmetic 
precision is sacrificed in order to provide more space or time for logical 
decisions.
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Specialized input-output equipment is needed to enable the two computers, 
TASC and ILLIAC, to talk to each other. The input equipment, ILLI, receives 
a clear picture word; 7& digits in parallel; from TASC, rearranges the order 
of the digits and shifts them into ILLIAC tetrad by tetrad. Such handling 
prepares the word for efficient unpacking and testing by ILLIAC. Subsequent 
re-reading by ILLIAC of the tetrads of this same word in different ways can 
be executed and occurs from time to time ■vhere necessary. The arrangement 
of the clear picture word digits as they rest in the ILLI holding register 
before shifting into ILLIAC is shown in figure 2.
Output messages from ILLIAC are handled by ILLO, a dispatch box which 
routes the message toward TASC or toward some other discrete address 
depending on whether the message is a clear picture annotation or a command.
For use in the JNS program, objects tracked by TASC are divided into 
l6 classes:
Class Abbreviation
Binary
Code
unidentified aircraft Uac 0000
hostile aircraft Hac 0100
probable friend aircraft ' Pac 1000
friend aircraft Fac 1100
unidentified ship Uship 0001
hostile ship Hship 0101
probable friend ship Pship 1001
friend ship Fship 1101
unidentified submarine Usub 0010
hostile submarine Hsub 0110
friend submarine Fsub 1110
Avoidee Av 0011
Strikee St 0110
Carrier Cv 1010
Protectee Pr 1011
Friendly Other 
(ignoree)
is 1111
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The third column of the above table shows how four of the 76 binary digits 
in the clear picture word are employed to encode the classification which 
serves not only to aid control personnel in identifying tracks as they 
appear on the displays but also, along with other identity digits, indicates 
to ILLIAC the nature of processing required for the track.
When a clear picture word is read into ILLIAC the computer determines 
from the word's class and other identity digits which of the control or 
evaluation operations are necessary at this time. Those routines of the 
control program are called into play and the necessary computation, operations, 
and commands are all made within the 20 msec in which the data expressed by 
this word are available.
Whenever, due to the nature of the object represented by the clear 
picture word being processed, it is necessary to record, for use at some 
future time, information about the action to be taken now, ILLIAC reinserts 
that information into TASC on that object’s track. Each time the object 
reappears on the clear picture the required information will be present in 
the word itself and readily available to ILLIAC. Humans monitoring the 
clear picture may observe this information and thus be informed of the 
actions of the control computer. For example, whenever a clear picture 
word representing an unfriendly un-paired object appears, ILLIAC immediately 
re-evaluates its threat and re-inserts this new valuation into TASC from 
which it is subsequently displayed on the clear picture. As a further 
example, whenever a weapon assignment is made by ILLIAC, appropriate marks 
are inserted into TASC on the tracks of the weapon platform and its target. 
When displayed on subsequent clear picture frames they reassure human monitors 
that the assignment has been made and they inform ILLIAC that vectoring or 
etc. operations and commands should now be generated for the friendly weapon 
carrier which received the assignment.
It is, of course, not possible to have all pertinent information about 
a given object present in its clear picture word. The operation to be 
performed on a given object may require data from some other tracked object; 
threats are always evaluated with respect to some friendly object; weapon 
assignments involve both an attacker and a victim; and, further, all 
steering or vectoring operations involve some object toward which travel
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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instructions are calculated for the traveler. And so it is necessary for 
ILLIAC to store, in its own fast access memory, information taken from 
certain clear picture words to he used in the processing of other clear 
picture words. Finally, there are some data needed hy ILLIAC which are not 
contained in any clear picture word and must, therefore, he stored in 
ILLIAC before operations begin. Strong attempts have been made in the 
control program design to hold the amount of information necessary to be 
thus stored to a minimum.
Some of the consequences of the limited storage available in ILLIAC
are:
Ik The computer never reviews any of its past actions in order 
to substitute a better one.
2. Once embarked on a course of action on a tracked object,
ILLIAC never terminates this action even when the course of 
action reaches a natural terminus.
3. In weapon assignment, only a single 1:1 matching of weapon 
vs. foe can be accomplished.
4. There are a few sequences of operations on a single object 
which cannot easily be done, even with human assistance.
Limitations 1., 2. and 3» are alleviated or removed by the control 
personnel. By manipulation of the clear picture word status and 
identification digits which determine the type of processing to be done 
by ILLIAC, the operating personnel who are watching clear picture displays 
can override ILLIAC, make alternate assignments, terminate actions, and 
designate which, if any, control operations are to be carried out by the 
computer on particular objects being tracked. This kind of intervention, 
by manipulation of clear picture digits, is easy to do with engineered 
keysets, and visual confirmation of manual actions taken comes quickly 
back to the displays. Intervention into ILLIAC’s program, however, is 
not so easy and, for the most part, is expected to be only infrequently 
necessary. There are a few conceivable sequences of treatments for a 
single tracked object which would need human intervention via ILLIAC 
(rather than via TASC), and it is these that are indicated by limitation 
k.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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The information on tracked objects which is stored in ILLIAC includes 
specific characteristics of the 128 friendly objects which can be controlled« 
It contains such things as the objects’ weapon strength, pursuit range, 
state of readiness, present mission and, for aircraft, the address or name 
of home carrier. Of the approximately 500 memory locations available in 
ILLIAC for such storage, 256 of these are used for storing information on 
the missions of each of the 128 friendly controlled objects. Each of these 
128 objects has a unique Assigned Track Number (ATN) which serves not only 
the control personnel as a name for the track, but also as an address in 
ILLIAC for locating the pertinent memory bank words. Distribution of 
ILLIAC memory space as used in the JNS program is shown in figure 5 and 
summarized in figure k taken from R-7^«
It can be seen that there are four words in the P-bank. Each word 
is numbered by an address 1, 2, 5, or 4. The Protectee whose ATN is 5 
must be stored at Address 5* In each of these words may be stored the 
coordinates of one Protectee which must be used by ILLIAC for threat 
evaluation every time an intruder appears on the clear picture. Next to 
the P-bank in figure 2 are shown the Carrier banks C1 and Cg, containing 
8 words each. Eight carriers can be accomodated here, with each carrier 
having one C1 Bank word and one Cg bank word. A Carrier whose ATN = 1 
and which is also a Protectee would use P-bank No. 1 word, C, Bank No. 1 
word, and C2 Bank No. 1 word. It would also use CP Bank No. 1 word to 
hold the ATN’s of its own next 5 carrier planes to be launched. Finally, 
its mission data would be found in the No. 1 words of the mission banks,
B, and B2 .
The contents of ILLIAC memory banks are shown in Appendix I for the 
various classes of controlled objects requiring memory space.
Avoidees, a class which has been briefly referred to but which will 
be discussed later in this report, require >4 more banks of 6 words each 
to accomodate 6 Avoidees, one word per Avoidee per bank. A set of k 
words, one from each Avoidee bank, pertaining to a particular Avoidee 
whose number is 1 = i = 6 is shown in Appendix I.
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FIG.3 FRIENDLY OBJECTS IN 
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CONFIDENTIAL
Type of Operational 
Object
ILLIAC Storage 
Banks Used
Permissible 
Assigned 
Track Number 
(ATN) Range
REMARKS
Wot a
Carrier Protectee Bl, B2, Cl, C2, CP 1-8 ATN = 0, permissible but neglected
Protectee Carrier Bl, B2, Cl, C2, CP,P 1-k ATN = 0, permissible but neglected
Georef Protectee P 1-b ATN = 0, permissible but neglected
Aircraft Protectee Bl, B2, P 1-4 ATN = 0, permissible 
but neglected
Surface Protectee Bl, B2, P 1-4 ATN = 0, permissible 
but neglected
Friend Aircraft Bl, B2 0-127
Friend Surface Bl, B2 0-127
Friend Subsurface Bl, B2 0-127
Friend Other Bl, B2 0-127 If Friend Other is to be processed its ATN 
must not coincide with 
that of any other object. 
If not to be processed, 
there is no restriction 
of the ATN.
Figure 4. IlilAC Memory Storage Banks Used by the Various Types of Friendly Objects
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For completeness, the following rules and limitations apply to assigned 
track numbers. The friendly object wqrth ATN 0 cannot be assigned to 
any of the six hostile classes: Unidentified Surface, Unidentified Subsurface, 
Foe Surface, Foe Subsurface, Probable Friend Surface, or Strikee. The 
friendly object with ATN 0 can be assigned to the three hostile classes: 
Unidentified Aircraft, Foe Aircraft, or Probable Friend Aircraft. No Avoidee 
Number (carried in the ATN digits) interferes with any other ATN in the 
system. Avoidees with Avoidee Number 0 are not processed. The Frame End 
Mark Numbers (carried in the ATN digits of especially marked Strikees) do 
not interfere with any other ATN in the system. It should be recalled that 
if no weapon is available to assign to a Bogey requiring weapons assignment, 
a characteristic "warning” broadcast is made to the discrete address receiver 
corresponding to ATN = 127. Any operational object can actually be assigned 
ATN = 127; the system will properly carry out all processings and control 
transmissions to this object. The object will in addition receive the 
"warning" transmissions. To the extent that this would be confusing, the
assignment of ATN = 127 to an actual operational object should be avoided. 
--------  — ------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 5
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Threat Evaluât ion
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In the JNS program, one of the major functions of the control computer 
is to evaluate the threat posed by aircraft which intrude into the 
surveillance area. Such aircraft as are classified Unidentified, Hostile, 
or Probable Friend are considered intruders and are subject to both 
automatic Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment. Objects such as ships 
or submarines are not so subject, although attack operations can be 
automatically carried out against them by the computer if a manual 
assignment is made by the control personnel.
Only friendly objects have Assigned Track Numbers, although the digits 
of the ATN box on other subclasses of clear picture words have meaning.
Until a weapon is assigned to these objects, the content of the ATN box is 
read as a threat number, T. Initially this number is zero and will 
gradually be raised by ILLIAC in increments, AT, until it passes the weapon 
threshold for that particular task, whereupon automatic weapon assignment will 
occur. The method for calculating and applying AT is as follows.
A Protectee is a special class of friendly object with respect to which 
all threats are calculated. It can be chosen from among the ships, carriers, 
submarines or aircraft of a task group or, if preferred, may be established 
as a georef point. Two or more Protectees can be designated and deployed 
to define a particular shape of defense area, although the limit of the 
present program is four. These four (or less) are chosen by the operating 
personnel and their identities are loaded into the ILLIAC Protectee memory 
bank (P-bank) before normal operations begin. During operations, ILLIAC 
keeps the up-to-date Protectee position coordinates stored in this bank and 
employs these data for calculating threat increments for non-friendly 
aircraft, as explained below.
All Protectees, stored in the P-bank possess a pre-set parameter, R , 
which represents the radius of an imaginary circle drawn about each Protectee 
and is called the "Threat Radius". When an unpaired (no weapon assigned) 
intruding aircraft appears in a clear picture word, ILLIAC first tests whether 
T, its threat index, has yet exceeded the threshold for weapons assignment.
If not, it immediately calculates the range to each Protectee, rejecting all 
but the least.
Having found the nearest Protectee, ILLIAC proceeds to calculate an 
increment which it will add to the threat index of the bogey. (For brevity
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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the intruding aircraft -will be called a "bogey” in this discussion 
although he may actually be an identified Hostile or a Probable Friend.) 
In this calculation, three criteria, size, range, and closing velocity 
are used which are incorporated as terms of the equation
a t  = ( a r )8 + (¿sr)B + (¿a)y.
(AT)g is the threat increment due to size or importance. It is zero if 
the clear picture size digit, S^, is zero. If = 1, ILLIAC inserts 
that fixed value of (AT)g which the control personnel have originally 
installed in ILLIAC’s control parameter storage bank. (AT)r is the 
threat increment due to penetration of the threat radius, and is 
numerically equal to C_ (R - R) where C„ is a pre-set weighting parameter,R O R q %
R the pre-set Threat Radius of the Protectee, and R is the "10 /o Range" o
to the Protectee.
(AT) is the threat increment due to the bogey’s closing velocity on
the Protectee and is equal to C V R— r~— , where C^ is a pre-set weighting
constant and V is the bogey’s velocity. If AX and AY are the components
of range R from the bogey to the Protectee and x and y the bogey’s velocity
*v *£components, then ILLIAC evaluates v *
TBT
as
V . R x(Ax) + y (Ay)
|R| R
which is equivalent to V cos O^y
Having assembled AT according to the rules just explained, this 
increment is added to the old threat number, T, and the resulting new 
threat number is written back into TASC at the bogey’s address.
Attention is called to the fact that the terms (s) (AT)r and/or
* All distances calculated for threat evaluation are done by means of a 
simple approximation. The distance, R, between two points whose rectangular 
components of separation are AX and AY is given by R ^  |L\ + L'where |L| is
the larger of J AX | or | AY| and |S| is the smaller. The error in this 
calculation is always positive and varies from zero, when either AX or AY 
is zero, to a maximum of 11.8 °/o, when one component is twice as large as 
the other. Hereafter in this report we shall refer to any range approx­
imated by this method as "10 °/o R".
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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(AT)V may sometimes be negative depending respectively on whether the "bogey 
is outside the threat radius Rq and/or whether it is moving away from, rather 
than toward, the Protectee. Thus the total increment AT = (AT)s + (AT)r + (AT)^ 
may he negative, and the new threat number may sometimes he smaller than the 
old. A hogey could fly into the fringes of the surveillance area and, without 
exceeding threat threshold for weapon assignment, fly out again without being 
attacked. During this maneuver, a clear picture observer would see the threat 
index at first increase and then decrease hack to zero.
A thumbnail sketch of the operational details of Threat Evaluation is 
presented below for reference by control personnel.
(i) AT = (AT)s + (AT)r + (AT)
V.R(AT)g + Cr (Rq “ R) + ¿y |R|
Threat increment 
per mile 
penetration
^  .  •
V.R _ x(Ax) + y(Ay)
\R| " R
Threat increment 
per 1.5 secs of 
closing velocity
(AT)q « 220 + 219 + 218............. 21 + 2°.
R = 511 miles o
Cp = 221 + 220 + 219R
\[*2 “=l)x + y
,2^  + 2°. plus fractions.
* i. 0-l , n- 2 , n-3 , 0-4 , 0-5 . 0-6 miles
V ü
x f  (T )  2 'J' + 2_£" + 2""' + 2 "" + 2 " '  + 2 . Rv ' 1.5 secs
É (*) 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + 1/32 + 1/64 2i i es
= 2*1-00 knots
secs
So V = 3600 knots 
Cy = 259 + 250 + 257, .21 + 2°
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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(ii) 10 °/o R is used for finding R and closest Protectee
(iii) T never goes below zero (although sometimes A T <  0)
(iv) Threat Thresholds TQOOOtL, T0100th, and T1000th should be 
chosen substantially less than 127, preferably less than 120, so that T 
cannot recycle. If threat threshold were 125 and AT =2, T would pass 
the Weapon Assignment threshold without being detected, and return to 
zero, (see Weapon Assignment for significance of threat thresholds.)
Weapon Assignment
Threat Evaluation, per se, in the JNS Program makes no distinction*between the three non-Friendly subclasses of aircraft ; it is only at the 
transition from Threat Evaluation to Weapon Assignment that the distinction 
is made. Each of these three classes is given an independent threat index 
threshold for Weapon Assignment which is selected and inserted by control 
personnel into ILLIAC’s control parameter memory bank. Whenever an un­
paired (unassigned) UHP aircraft appears on the clear picture wires, the 
control computer, before calculating a new AT, first tests whether the 
threat number, T, has yet exceeded ^ k reSk0ici ^or ^kat class.
Here and In R-7^ the notations Tolooth> and Tloooth are
used to designate the Threat Number thresholds for Unidentified, Hostile,
and Probable Friend aircraft, respectively. By a suitable choice of
relative values for the T , , , one may set the relative tolerancetnre sn. s
of the automatic defense system for the three classes of intruders. Thus, 
generally speaking, one might expect to provide a significantly lower 
threshold, TQ100tii  ^ for a Hostile than for a Probable Friend, thereby 
allowing more time for a proper identification of the latter before pairing 
him with a weapon. On the other hand, existing doctrine may dictate that 
the only safe distinctions allowable are between UEPae and Fac, that all 
UHPac should be treated alike by setting T0000th = T0100th = T1000th#
Such choices are provided for the control personnel within the flexibility
* Throughout this report reference is frequently made to the three non-Friendly 
subclasses: Unidentified, Hostile, Probable Friend. For convenience here,
and on some of the actual control equipment, ohe abbreviation UHP is employed. 
Thus UHPac means Unidentified, Hostile or Probable Friend aircraft. Similar 
abbreviations are used for other objects such as F-ship (Friend Ship,) UHF-sub 
(Unidentified, Hostile, or Friend Submarine, etc.)
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of the control parameters.
If, on testing whether T has exceeded ^ , ILLIAC finds that such
is the case, threat evaluation stops and control is immediately transferred 
to the Weapons Assigner portion of the program, if it is not already in 
use. By it, the pertinent data relative to the bogey are written into a 
set of temporary storage registers called the Bogey Bank, and the bogey’s
speed I V-. | is calculated (10 °/o) and recorded. Storing of bogey in the 1 B
Bogey Bank is tantamount to setting a "Weapons Assigner On" switch to 
positive and insures that no other weapon assignment can be initiated before 
the current one is completed.
Completion of a Weapon Assignment takes slightly more than one clear 
picture frame time. In this interval every available weapon will appear to 
ILLIAC, one by one in the clear picture transmission and, because the Weapon 
Assigner is "on", will be tested for possible assignment to the bogey. 
Preliminary tests are carried out on each friendly weapon as it appears on 
the clear picture to ascertain if an assignment is even reasonable. If these 
tests are passed, then a calculated suitability index Rc of that weapon is 
compared with the recorded Rc of the best weapon of that type so far encountered 
in the frame. If the new weapon under test is found to be more suitable, then 
its identity and capability is substituted for the one previously temporarily 
stored and is used for comparison against any additional weapons of its type 
which may appear in the frame. As a consequence of these actions, at the 
end of the weapon assignment frame ILLIAC has in temporary storage the best 
of each type of friendly weapon available for the assignment.
The JNS Program recognizes four types of weapons for use against aircraft:
AA guns (or short range missiles), aircraft on combat patrol, carrier planes*ready for launching, and long range AA missiles . During a weapon assignment 
frame each of these types is evaluated independently until the frame ends.
Thus, when the frame is finished, the temporary storage locations provided for 
the purpose will contain information on the identity and capability of
1. the best gun
and 2. the best CAP plane (airborne)
* For concreteness we have chosen TALOS as the particular long range missile.
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and 5. the best carrier plane (on deck)
and k. the best TALOS (launcher).
At this time, ^0 msecs, is provided for the Overall Weapon Assigner portion 
of the program to choose one from among these four weapons and actually 
make the assignment by
(a) sending an announcement message to the (Friendly) weapon 
or its platform,
(b) making appropriate changes in the clear picture word of 
the Friendly to indicate the mission,
(c) making appropriate changes in the clear picture word of 
the bogey to indicate the kind of defensive reaction in 
progress. In the event of a plane or gun assignment the 
bogey threat number will be overwritten by the ATN of the 
assigned Friendly; S.^ will be set = 1 to indicate this 
new meaning of the T-ATN box numbers; and will be 
either set = 1 or left = 0 depending on whether a Friendly 
gun or Friendly plane received the assignment. In the 
event of a missile assignment, the bogey’s class will be 
changed to Avoidee and other operations will be performed 
which we shall discuss later.
Thereafter, whenever the bogey appears on the clear picture, ILLIAC 
will know from the fact that 3 ^ = 1  that it has in hand a paired bogey 
whose up-to-date position and velocity it must extract and save for 
transmission to its paired Friendly. The required data is extracted from 
the Bogey’s clear picture word and stored in the two ILLIAC mission bank 
words of the appropriate Friendly, the address of the latter being obtained 
from the ATN which appears on the bogey’s clear picture word. Whenever 
the Friendly re-appears on the clear picture, ILLIAC will furnish steering 
or aiming advice regarding its paired bogey. In order to promptly accom­
plish this, ILLIAC need only consult the Friend’s mission bank words where 
the bogey information is stored, perform the simple calculations, and 
output a message via the discrete address communication link.
Some of the details of how the 1-frame Weapon Assignment search is 
carried out will be given below and will include the nature of the tests 
conducted on clear picture words representing potential weapons for assignment.
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Frame Marks
Having stored a bogey in the Bogey Bank, ILLIAC is faced -with the need 
for listening to the clear picture for exactly one frame to find a weapon.
At the end of the frame certain operations must be carried out which could 
take more than the 20 msecs, duration of a clear picture word. To assist 
in these requirements, two artificial permanent tracks are kept on the clear 
picture for use as FRAME END MARKS and are called FEM-0 and FEM-1. Their 
class digits S11 - are marked 0111, Strikee, but these objects are 
distinguished from valid Strikees by their S1 digit which is always set to 
1. Valid Strikees (which are always mission targets of some kind) are 
recognized by S^ =0.
It was felt that, besides the two marks required by the control program, 
additional fictitious marking tracks might be useful for other purposes on 
the clear picture. A total of k could be used to mark the corners of the 
511 x 511 mile surveillance area. Any number needed may be added (up to a 
ridiculous 125) but ATN = 0 and ATN = 1 are reserved for the two required 
marks, FEM-0 and FEM-1, respectively. Fictitious tracks labeled STRIKEE,
= 1, ATN = 2 will not interfere with the action of FEM-0 or FEM-1 in 
Weapon Assignment, nor with the action taken on valid STRIKEES (S^ = 0) 
which may bear the same ATN.
When ILLIAC finds a Bogey over threat threshold, stores him in the Bogey 
Bank, and turns "on" the Weapon Assigner portion of the program, it continues 
processing subsequent clear picture words in the normal fashion until it 
encounters a FRAME END MARK. When this occurs, ILLIAC begins the weapon 
search. As each successive clear picture word comes in, ILLIAC tests its 
class. If it is a UHP a/c which is already paired with (assigned to) a 
weapon, the coordinates and velocity are extracted and saved for subsequent 
broadcast to the paired Friend. If it is a UHP a/c which has not yet passed 
threat threshold, a new threat number is calculated and written back into 
TASC. These are normal actions which occur whether or not Weapons Assigner 
is "on". If, on the other hand, a UHP object appears which needs Weapon 
Assignment, this action is deferred. At some later appearance on the clear 
picture cycle this need will still be apparent and the Weapon Assigner may 
not be already occupied and can be engaged. Finally, If any Friendly object 
appears to ILLIAC during the Weapon Assignment search frame, a series of
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tests, depending on its specific class, are applied to measure the Friend’s 
suitability for assignment to the waiting bogey.
These tests are described at length in R-7^ but are distributed 
throughout that report, appearing in descriptions of the complete treatment 
for given classes and separated under class headings. They appear in the 
present paper all in one section but in considerably reduced form, without 
much of the interesting discussion which the reader may find in R-71**
Weapons Assignment Tests
It should be recalled that the identity and certain characteristics 
of up to 128 friendly objects are stored in ILLIAC’s memory banks. These 
data supplement the small amount of information in the clear picture word. 
Whenever a clear picture word corresponding to one of the friendly objects 
enters ILLIAC on the clear picture cycle, the (weapon) memory banks may be 
consulted, the proper address being obtained or generated from the ATN 
found in the clear picture word itself. Any friendly objects which are 
armed may be considered for assignment to destroy a bogey .
In addition to specific characteristics of individually identified 
friendly objects which are stored in the weapon banks (called "Mission 
Banks"), certain other group characteristics of weapon types are stored 
as pre-set parameters in the Control Parameter bank. They include such 
things as
i Maximum initial range for gun weapon assignment
ii Maximum altitude for gun weapon assignment
iii Maximum and minimum ranges for carrier plane mission
iv Maximum and minimum missile ranges. (TAt»*)
\
and others which are used in the search for an available suitable weapon 
and are involved in the following tests.
Weapon Assignment Tests for GUN
During a Weapon Assignment clear picture frace,any objects of the
* The word bogey is used in this report as in R-7^ only to avoid tiresome 
repetition of the word UHPac (= UPH a/c). While its strict meaning is 
"Unidentified aircraft", the reader may safely substitute Unident., Hostile, 
or Prob. Friend a/c, whenever "Bogey" is encountered.
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classes, CARRIER (1010), PROTECTEE (1011) (but only if S2 = 1, "Surface") 
or FRIEND SURFACE (1101), all of which are AA gun platforms, are subjected 
to certain tests to determine the feasibility of assigning the bogey to one 
of them. This is done in lieu of the vectoring which would occur if the 
Weapon Assigner were not "on".
(a) The bogey's altitude Z.g is tested to make sure it does not 
exceed the maximum vertical gun range Z^.
(b) The slant range to bogey’s present position R ^ ^  B must not
exceed the maximum gun assignment range R_...GM
(c) The bogey must be closing on the gun platform in question:
-VB • FS *  1
(d) The distance of predicted closest approach is calculated to 
see if the bogey will subsequently come within gun ranged
<  rg
During the weapon assignment search, several possible AA gun candidates
may be found and a means for designating the "best” of these is provided. If
tests abed are passed, the surface vessel under test represents a possible
choice for the assignment. Its present range to the bogey, , is used
as a criterion and is called the "Characteristic distance for gun, R^". 'Eke
smallest R__ of any ship so far encountered is temporarily stored, along with
the ship's identity, in a special memory bank called "best gun". Whenever,
during the frame, a vessel with a smaller R__ is found, this new ship willbG
replace the one previously stored under "best gun". Hence, at the end of the
search frame, the memory location "best gun" will contain the R__ and identitybG
of the nearest AA platform capable of taking the assignment.
Weapons Assignment Tests for CAP
Aircraft on combat patrol are recognized by ILLIAC from their clear picture 
word class digits (ilOO FRIENDLY A/c) and their mission
digits S1S2 (00 *4* CAP). When one of these is encountered in a weapon assignment 
search, it must first be ascertained whether enough fuel remains to safely make
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the intercept and return. The ability to make this decision depends upon 
the maintenance of an up-to-date posting of the fuel remaining in each 
patrol plane aloft. Digits of the clear picture word are provided
to carry this notation and it is the responsibility of the control personnel 
to manually insert this datum via keyset on advice from the aircraft pilots. 
More sophisticated techniques such as fuel dead reckoning or telemetering 
are possible but have not been employed for this elementary program.
In calcinating fuel-needed ( G ^ ^ )  for comparison with fuel-has 
(GT,Aa) a simplification and a safety factor are introduced by assuming 
that the distance to be flown is a round trip to the present position of the 
bogey. But since no intercepts are ever assigned on a bogey which is not 
closing the CAP, the round trip to the actual intercept point will probably 
be less unless highly evasive maneuvers are encountered. Hence, ILLIAC first 
calculates R p _ , the 10 °/o range from the CAP in question to the bogey, 
and subsequently calculates g(Rpj^ B) = GiNjEEr)EI)- The fuel consumption para­
meter, g = fuel per round trip mile, is one of the pieces of information 
stored by ILLIAC on each friendly aircraft under its control.
If the CAP passes the first test, g(Rp-^ B) = GffiI)ED = G ^ ,  a second 
test is imposed to discover if the bogey is closing on the CAP, the test
being -V_. R <  1. Upon passing this test, the characteristic distance
R = R^ ^  is compared with the "best" one so far encountered. The plane CP P -r'B
with the smaller R is temporarily stored in memory location "Best CAP".Ox i ■
Weapon Assignment for Carrier Plane (on deck)
In those paragraphs above which describe Weapon Assignment tests for 
GUN, it was said that all armed surface vessels are tested for a possible 
gun assignment. This of course includes CARRIERS. However, a CARRIER may 
possess a more effective and desirable weapon in the form of a combat plane 
ready for launching and so must undergo further tests to discover if this 
is so.
Like any other weapon, a deck plane has a maximum range, beyond which 
it cannot carry out intercept missions. Unlike airborne CAP planes, a deck 
plane requires significant time for launching and achieving altitude and
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should not be assigned to intercepts which are close-in. Two control 
parameters, R^p^ an(3- define the maximum and minimum assignment
ranges are stored in the ILLIAC Control Parameter Bank and are used to test 
whether the distance ^ from Friend Surface (Carrier) to Bogey falls
within practical limits.
If the range tests are passed, and although further tests are necessary 
before it is certain that an intercept by one of its planes is even possible, 
ILLIAC at this moment tests to see if the present CARRIER would be a better 
assignment than the last one tentatively stored (as a deck plane) under "best 
CARRIER PLANE". If the CARRIER in hand represents no improvement, there will 
be enough time remaining from the original 20 msec, to enter the FRIEND 
SURFACE routines and either carry out a gun weapon assignment or a vectoring 
operation.
The measure of worth for the assignment is taken to be RCCp = Rp«
The CARRIER closer to the bogey, i.e. with smaller RCCp> is regarded as the 
better assignment. If the CARRIER at hand meets this criterion, further 
tests for practicality are carried out.
The first of these is to learn whether the CARRIER has planes available. 
This test is accomplished by examining the CP-Bank word whose address 
corresponds to the CARRIER under test. Each CARRIER recorded in ILLIAC*s 
memory banks has one CP-Bank word which (if full) contains the ATN*s of the 
next five interceptors ready for launching. As they are used up (by receiving 
assignments) ILLIAC will shift them out of the left hand end of the register 
and the register may become exhausted (all zeros). It is the duty of the 
control personnel to keep these memory spaces supplied with ATN’s as long as 
there are corresponding planes in readiness.
Should ILLIAC find there is at least one plane in readiness aboard the
CARRIER it finally computes the scalar quantity -V^ . t° see if the
bogey is closing the CARRIER. If the result is negative, the bogey is indeed 
closing, and the CARRIER ATN, the CARRIER PLANE ATN and the characteristic
distance, RlCCPJ are all stored in the "Best CARRIER PLANE" location for later
use by the overall weapons assignment routines.
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Weapon Assignment Tests for TALOS
TALOS weapon assignment tests are, like those for (AA) guns, part 
of the FRIEND SURFACE routines. Either TALOS tests or "gun” tests are 
conducted on each FRIEND SURFACE during a weapon search frame. Ships 
are regarded either as Talos platforms or as (AA) "gun" platforms, hut 
not both. They are distinguished in ILLIAC by two armament type digits 
found in the Bank 1 word and which must be pre-set by control personnel.
00 •=$» unarmed, 01 =£= guns, 10 or 11 ■=*=: Talos.
Like CARRIER PLANES, missiles such as Talos require targets which 
lie in a ring shaped area centered around the launcher. The outer radius 
(Rt m ) °f 'the ring is closely related to the maximum flight range of the 
weapon while the inner radius (R^.) is a function of acquisition and 
launching time, and time for firm control to be established by the 
guidance radar.
In testing a TALOS ship for possible assignment, if ILLIAC decides 
that the ship’s range-to-the-bogey, lies between the maximum
and minimum TALOS assignment ranges, R ^  and R^, the assignment is 
regarded as a possible one. It remains to be compared with other possible 
TALOS (launcher) assignments that may be found in the same weapon search 
frame and, for this purpose, the quantity R ^  = R ^  - RpS^  £ is calculated 
and compared with the one currently held in the "Best Talos" memory 
location. Since the quantity R for a Talcs ship is considered "better" 
whenever it is smaller, the test has the property of choosing that TALOS 
ship which is farther from the target, providing more time for target 
location, launching, and lock-on.
Thumbnail Sketch of Weapon Assignment Tests
Gun: Zg <
■^ FS-*\B ^  RGM
1 (closing)
RCG B
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CAP: calc. 10 /o gRP-y B Seeded
test Seeded “ S aS ^ 3  " S6^
"VB * F ^  1 (closill£)
RCP = B
CARRIER PLANE:
Rr-*‘B ^  RcPMax ^  * * * * *  R 
Has planes? Ready to launch?
-VB 1 (closing)
RCCP = S  B
CPMin
TALOS: ^  S sMin B %Max
RCT S m  S s -v b  Max
\\ //
Launch point closest to max. range is best.
Overall Weapon Assignment
The pages immediately above have described how ILLIAC searches through 
one frame of clear picture words, determining which CAP planes, Carrier (deck) 
planes, AA "guns", and TALOS ships are capable of taking an assignment to the 
bogey which is temporarily stored in the bogey bank awaiting assignment. In 
carrying out the search, ILLIAC has saved in four special storage locations
/the identity of the best weapon of each type. Throughout the frame, as it 
came across better weapons it changed the contents of these four storage words 
to correspond to its latest findings. Finally, at the end of the weapon search 
frame, ILLIAC has stored
1. Best CAP (ATN, DA,
2. Best CARRIER A/C (ATN _ , ATN , R )' x plane carrier cc
3. Best TALOS ship (ATN, R )
k. Best GUN (AA ship) (ATN, DA, R )eg
The R ’s are called Characteristic Distances and may be used as criteria of c
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merit within each weapon class. However, since the characteristic distances
are no^ all defined alike, and the effectiveness of the weapons differ for
one reason or another, the R ’s for the four "best” weapons cannot bec
directly compared. To make them comparable and to provide a basis for 
selection of the one "best" from among the four "best" weapons, special
weighting factors a. are applied to the R ’s to yield figures of merit,i c
( f f l ) j .
1 . ( ™ ) p
ii Rcp
•CVJ (FM )o ii P o Rcc
3 . (FM )t
tí?ii R 4-et
k . (™)g tíWil R
Cg
Each of the icontrol p¡
control personnel and can be chosen in such a way as to establish selection 
priorities among the four weapon types.
If it is desired, the priority may be made absolute so that, regardless 
of range, a certain weapon type, if available, will always be chosen over 
any other. For example, it may be arranged that, when available, a CAP will 
always be assigned before a carrier plane, a carrier plane before a TAIX)S, 
a TALOS before a gun. A more sophisticated choice preferred by the author 
is described in Appendix II where, for the benefit of control personnel, 
the weapon assignment priority problem is discussed more fully.
Having constructed the (FM^’s and inserted them in the four "Best 
Weapon" memory words, the computer now has all the information it needs to 
actually make the weapon assignment. Comparing the (FM)^’s, it chooses the 
weapon with the smallest (FM) and executes the proper write outputs.
1. If the bogey is assigned to a friendly plane on combat air
patrol, ILLIAC
a. writes the friend's ATN into the bogey’s threat number- 
ATN box on the bogey’s memory word in TASC, 
b* changes the bogey’s (in TASCj to 1 to indicate it as now 
assigned,
c. changes the friend’s S-jSg (in TASC) to 01 to indicate it 
as on an intercept mission,
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b.
c.
and d. broadcasts a type 1(B) message to friend’s discrete address
receiver to indicate change of mission from CAP to INTERCEPT.
On each appearance of the bogey on subsequent clear picture frames, the 
bogey's position and velocity coordinates will be extracted and written into the 
friend’s mission bank in ILLIAC, the proper address being found from the 
friend’s ATN which was written into the bogey's clear picture word threat number 
box at the time of weapon assignment.
On subsequent clear picture appearances of the friend now on intercept, 
the up-to-date bogey coordinates found in the friend's mission bank words are 
employed in the computation of a mission vector.
2. If the bogey is assigned to a carrier (plane, on deck) ILLIAC
a. Writes the carrier plane's ATN into the bogey's threat 
number-ATN box in TASC,
changes the bogey's Sj-*-l to indicate "assigned", 
changes the friendly plane's S^S^-^Ol to indicate INTERCEPT 
MISSION,
and d. broadcasts a type l(B) message to the friendly plane (this 
would normally be received by the carrier) to alert it for 
the intercept mission.
Vectors for the mission are computed from information obtained and recorded 
in the same way as for intercept assignments which fall to CAP.
3. If the bogey is assigned to Talos, ILLIAC
a. changes the bogey's class from Unidentified a/c to Avoidee,
b. writes a preliminary Avoidee number of 6b into the bogey's 
threat number-ATN box,
Sets bogey's (now Avoidee) S^*”l> indicating PRIORITY Avoidee,- 
writes the standard TALOS avoidance area dimensions, Ax and 
Ay, into 3k - S^,
e. outputs a type 1(B) message to the friendly (Talos) ship, 
alerting it to its assignment and giving bogey's coordinates 
and dram address.
On the next appearance of the "bogey", now an Avoidee, ILLIAC detects 
from its number, 6k, that it is a new Talos target, therefore a new priority 
Avoidee requiring storage in ILLIAC's Avoidee bank. During vectoring routines
c.
d.
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for friendly aircraft, ILLIAC always checks these banks to see whether 
the aircraft is in any of the Avoidee areas, and if so, modifies its 
vectoring accordingly. Bookkeeping rules for Avoidees are discussed 
later under "Object Class Characteristics— Avoidees".
4. If the bogey is assigned to "GUNS", Illiac
a. writes the friendly "gun" platform’s ATN into the bogey's 
ATN box,
b. changes the bogey's digit-*»1, indicating "assigned",
c. changes the bogey’s Sv-*“1, indicating "to 'guns'",
d. outputs a type l(B) message to the "gun" platform, 
giving bogey's spatial coordinates and drum address. 
Quotation marks around the word, GUNS, are provided 
because this author wishes to indicate that this category 
need not be considered specific. Because of their 
elementary nature, the "gun" routines of this program are 
equally applicable to (though not necessarily sufficient 
for) all short range missiles, ballistic (shells, etc.) 
or otherwise (rockets, etc.).
5. If there is no weapon at all available, the overall weapons 
assignment routine will find the "Best Weapon" storage banks empty, and
a warning will be transmitted. This always has the form of a GUN weapon 
assignment message to the special address, ATN = 127 (decimal, 7L 
sexadecimal).
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Vectoring
Vectoring can "be provided for all classes of friendly objects but, 
for the sake of economy, a distinction is made between the type of guidance 
calculated for aircraft and the type provided for the slow moving surface 
vessels. In bringing two friendly ships together, it scarcely matters 
whether one is directed on a collision course or a pursuit course if the 
vectored ship has a noticeable speed advantage, and that can be arranged 
at leisure. Furthermore, any navigator who is steadily receiving pursuit 
course vectors (range and bearing, present position) to another ship can 
very easily employ them in re-calculating an exact or approximate collision 
course. On the other hand, it is highly desirable that an airborne interceptor 
be guided on a pre-calculated collision course in such a way as to allow the 
final approach to be made from some optimum angle.
When the original program was written, recommended directions for final 
approach were between 15° ahead of, and 30° behind, the line through the 
bogey perpendicular to the bogey's heading; acceptable angles were from 60° 
ahead to 60° behind. These or any other arbitrary final approaches could be 
guaranteed for most intercepts if only the program had the capacity to calculate 
an initial off-set. Since minimum initial offset cannot be guaranteed, the 
original program suffers from a very serious fault not foreseen when it was 
first designed. The important control parameterd. is subject to severe
restrictions in value. If the ratio of -1----  is too small, interceptions
VBogey
will be terminated at any time the bogey flies directly toward the interceptor, 
regardless of range, and will be terminated at various ranges if only most 
of the bogey's velocity is toward the interceptor.
To understand this limitation it is necessary to first understand the 
original program, a description of which follows immediately below. After 
that, the reader will find a detailed discussion of the limitation and a 
proposal for how to live with it.
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JNS A/C Vectoring Routines
An economical concession to simplicity is the calculation of a pseudo­
collision course instead of a true one. Like the true point of collision, 
the pseudo-collision point defined by Snyder’s approximation lies on the 
projection of the bogey’s flight. Generally it lies further ahead and, as 
the range draws nearer, the pseudo-collision point moves continuously 
inward, along the bogey’s projected flight path, always approaching the true 
collision point. At a cost of flying intercepts on a slightly longer path 
significant savings in the arithmetic and programming are accomplished by 
the simplification.
Figure 6 illustrates some of the quantities employed in calculating
the pseudo-collision point
c  *■
Point B represents the position
x^y^ of a bogey whose course is
directed along the line BC with
velocity V - . .  Fac represents a B
friendly interceptor (whose
velocity vl is not shown), j?
Point C is the .point on the
bogey's projected track where
collision would occur if the
friend were vectored at speed
v on a straight collision course F
The problem is to find the
coordinates x , y„ of point C c c
in order to calculate the
intercept vector R . 
* cPlainly, the distance BC is just v£t where t is the time to intercept,
and the x-coordinate of the collision puint is xc = x^ + Xgt . But the
exact expression for t* is complex and would require a relatively long time
to calculate. The Snyder economy is to approximate t by calling it the
time required for the Fac to fly the distance Eg to the bogey if the bogey
were at rest. Thus, instead of calculating t* = R which is impossible
" F * x
since R is the principal unknown, the program calculates t = t ’ = —  Rg, c F
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where Rg is the 10 °/o approximation of the present distance to the bogey.
A final economy is invoked in taking the speed of the friend, v , to be a
pre-set constant, The resulting expression for x is now cx> c
Xc' = *B + *B “ d y0 ls yC = yB + y % •
At first hand it may not be obvious that the substitution of a fixed
constant, a, for is economical or advantageous, particularly when v^ ,
is easily availablS to ILLIAC. To appreciate some of its usefullness, it
is necessary to consider the effect of a larger or smaller than the exact
v . Without recourse to the mathematical treatment contributed by P. G.F
Braunfeld in R-7 ,^ it is intuitively apparent that if we employ an a which
assumes a greater speed for the interceptor than it actually has (i.e. cx.<----),
F
the friendly aircraft will not quantitative^ fulfill ILLIAC’s trusting expectation.
Every few seconds, when ILLIAC calculates a new vector, "thinking" that the
interceptor it is guiding is actually faster than it is, it will tend to provide
an insufficient lead. As the interception draws to a close, the error in lead
angle approaches zero, but the interceptor has already been committed to a
later interception than was first calculated and will therefore approach from
a more sternward direction. Extreme choices of a « ~ — will result in tail
F
chases for all cases except those in which 0, the angle between the bogey’s 
course and the friend’s starting position, is very small#
Similarly, when a »  — , ILLIAC assumes the friend is much slower than he
VF
really is, calculates excessively large leads, and tends to bring about a 
head-on interception.
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Thus, for any one value of 0 and of v? it is possible to choose an a
which -will tailor the angle of final approach to any desired value. A
standard operational agreement based on the particular types of interceptors
carried in a Task Group may fix v_, but 0 is difficult to control. Conse-Ji
quently, the pre-set parameter, a, when used in the present control program, 
is optimized for a particular y over a wide class of 0 ‘s.
In a slightly more sophisticated program, the Weapon Assigner could be 
instructed to reject all tentative intercept assignments for which 0 was 
not suitable. With additional increases in computing capacity, several more 
refinements would be expected, not the least of which would be an intelligent 
method for overcoming altitude disadvantages by flying a curved interception 
path. For the present/ since the interception path is not programmed in any 
way to gain altitude, the Weapons Assigner is forced to employ minimum 
assignment ranges which are generously large.
There are other additions and refinements which would be most welcome 
in any vectoring program because of the improvement they could guarantee. 
However, in the opinion of the present writer, there is one respect in which 
we may be grateful for the frugality imposed by ILLIAC upon the program 
described in R-7^. It very beautifully enforced a principal which might be 
inadvertently jeopardized should time and capacity invite a more complex 
vectoring routine. One could unwittingly be tempted into the design of an 
interception control program which, with extreme efficiency as its goal, 
might in fact become critically sensitive to small errors in the measured 
parameters which were added for refinement. For tactical reasons, we 
should like to complete the interception at the earliest possible time 
unless certain other tactical considerations interfere• A program which 
makes use of reliable wind data would be superior, in this respect, to one 
which does not explicitly take account of windage. However, at the cost 
of flying somewhat longer paths, the latter program would prove to be the 
more reliable if the wind data showed inconstancy or inaccuracy. Unable 
to gather or use weather data, the JNS program calculates intercept vectors 
at frequent intervals on the basis of present positions and velocities, 
repeatedly correcting, albeit a few seconds late, for errors manifested in 
the last few seconds of flight* Somewhat longer flights result, but the
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eventual success of the interception is relatively insensitive to influences 
of wind, errors in tracking data, or pilot failure to respond instantly or 
accurately to vectoring commands.
Logical Error
The writer regrets to report that there is a logical error in the 
approximations which manifests itself whenever the angle FBC becomes small. 
The result of this error is  sometimes merely awkward, sometimes painful, 
depending on FBC and the ratio of ^  to v£ . To illustrate the difficulty,
imagine a head-on interception.
(E>
"4
1 F
Recall that - is
CL
the assumed speed of 
the friend as used by 
ILLIAC. The pseudo­
collision point which 
ILLIAC calculates is 
that point in front of 
B to which the bogey
could fly during the time it would take for the friend to fly to the
bogey’s present position, B. When v^ = the estimated collision point is
at F, independent of the distance FB. Inasmuch as ILLIAC terminates its
vectoring responsibility whenever range to the pseudo-collision point ^  Rg
(a pre-set parameter, usually set at ca. 10 miles) the interception for
the case illustrated is considered finished, regardless of the distance
FB which might still be very large.
Because an upper limit for vB is more or less predictable and - is
pre-settable it can usually be arranged that the pseudo-collision point will
always fall in front of, rather than on or (even worse) behind the interceptor,
This guarantees decent command headings to the friend but usually results in
*ILLIAC’s sending an END-0F-INTERCEPT message too early. About the best one 
can do within the framework of the present sub-routine is to select an a which
makes I/«» as large as possible without making l/a so large as to greatly
'B
* actually means "End of mid-course guidance; take over from here with A.-I. 
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increase the occurrence of tail chases. If the expected speed advantage is
in the ratio g g  S /  a g r  = I' ^  “ “ Ch°°Se « = 800 ’
The pseudo-collision point for a head-on meeting will then lie half way 
between B and F, regardless of distance. If Rg is set to 10 miles, the
END-OF-INTERCEPT will occur when the two planes are 20 miles apart.
Setting Rg to 8, which is about the minimum safe value, will delay END-OF- 
INTERCEPT until the planes are l6 miles apart. The interceptor pilot will 
then fly 8 miles as expected, during which time he would be attempting to 
acquire and lock-on the bogey with his own A.I. radar. By the time he has
flown 6 of the expected 8 miles, the bogey will have moved 4 miles, reducing
the distance between the planes to l6 - (6+4) = 8  miles. At about this 
time, lock-on should occur and final phase control initiated.
A substitute routine, designed by R. M. Brown of this laboratory has 
recently been inserted and is now undergoing tests. A supplement to the 
present report, containing some preliminary evaluation and opinion is 
planned for the near future, and may contain a description of the RMB 
substitution.
JNS Vectoring Summary
A thumbnail sketch of the sequence and nature of vectoring operations 
in the JNS program is given in what follows:
Any friendly object may be vectored. Infrequent, pursuit course vectors 
are provided for ships; frequent, pseudo-collision vectors for aircraft. 
Aircraft may receive automatic interception assignments and will be 
automatically vectored® A ship will be vectored only n  manual intervention 
sets up the conditions. To cause a friendly ship to be vectored to any 
non-friendly object, merely insert the friend’s ATN into the ATN digits of 
the non-friendly object. Artificial Strikees may be created for this purpose 
and can serve as static rendezvous points for two or more ships. A manual 
intervention into the appropriate ILLIAC Bank 2 word is necessary to undo 
this action.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
88-42 C O N F I D E N T I A L
Vectoring for air interceptions is performed as follows.
1. Assigned bogey, bearing ATN of a
friend a/c, appears to ILLIAC on C .P. peur'Rett/r«,
2. ILLIAC extracts x^y z^^ and y£ and
plants them in friend's ILLIAC mission 
bank.
3. Friend appears on C.P., marked as 
assigned for vectoring.
4. ILLIAC reaches into mission bank, 
unpacks x^gZgXg and yB and begins
vector calculation.
5. (friend-to-bogey) is calculated.
6. True collision point
coordinates x y would be given by c c
xc = XB + *B 
yc = yB + yB
where t is time required to fly Rc.
F
Collision coordinates are approximated 
by xm ym
xo = xm - + VV-B
yc " ym = yB + yBaEF- ■B
using fixed a to approximate — .
F
7. Range and bearing from friend is 
calculated to using 1 °7o
approximation for range 
1 °7o R = | Ax; | + | Ay | - I Asc/ I Ay Ii j o  ' ' + |Ay| )
9 (= bearing to mission point) is given in
256ths of a circle, called Semi-Snyds
8 ,
1 Kypta = 1 Snyd = of a circle = ^  radians.
Vector command is output 
via discrete address channel 
to friend. Calculation and 
broadcasts occur once each 
clear picture frame. 
Vectoring message contains
9 and R but not R_ c c F- B
See Appendix for message 
forms.
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CAP and Steer Vectoring
In addition to interception control, provision is made in the JNS 
vectoring routines for supplying navigation data to a friendly aircraft 
to assist it in reaching and maintaining a patrol station or to return 
it to a carrier. In both cases the information received by the aircraft 
identifies the type of mission (CAP vector vs. Return to Carrier) and 
supplies the bearing and distance to the mission reference point.
For friendly aircraft, the clear picture digits S.^ designate the 
present mission of the aircraft. ILLIAC always reads these digits in 
order to determine what type of processing is required. The interpre­
tations placed on the configurations of S-.Sp are: 0 0 CAP
x 01=c= INTERCEPT
10^= STEER 
11** STEER CRITICAL
When an aircraft is designated as being on CAP (S^Sg= 00) it is 
recognized by ILLIAC as available for weapon assignment. In giving it 
an assignment, ILLIAC will change S-^ Sg from 00=v=- CAP to Ol*^- INC*
This particular operation is, more truly, merely the setting of
and is the only change ILLIAC can make in those digits. CAP and STEER
are missions which can only be made by hand.
CAP Vectoring
At the time of initial loading into ILLIAC’s weapon banks, all 
friendly aircraft are semi-permanently marked according to the type of 
combat air patrol they should fly if ever assigned to CAP. Two types 
of combat air patrol are recognized by the Snyder program and are 
characterized by the nature of their patrol stations. They are colloquially 
called ’’Carrier CAP” and ’’Georef CAP”. The latter class flies a patrol 
orbit through or about a fixed map point while the former flies an orbit 
which bears some particular relation to its home carrier.
Carrier CAP is very flexible in the nature of the sequence of missions 
it can be given. Without recourse to intervention into the program it is 
possible to give a Carrier CAP aircraft successive missions of CAP, INTERCEPT,
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and STEER in any order or sequence.
Georef CAP, on the other hand, is not so flexible. The coordinates 
of the georef point to which its CAP station is related occupy, in the 
mission bank (B1 and B2) words, the space allotted to the mission coordinates 
Xj^  and yM* If the mission is georef CAP, xM = xQR and yM = yQR. If the 
mission is an interception with collision point xc yc then x^ = xc and 
y = y . When a georef CAP is placed on an intercept mission, the CAP
reference coordinates x ^ y  - become destroyed when over-written by thevxh GrK
new mission coordinates xf yff and the aircraft cannot be returned to CAP
simply by undoing the weapon assignment and changing S.^ back to 00.
The difference in flexibility between Carrier CAP and georef CAP
resides in the fact that the home carrier coordinates are never stored in
the locations xfl yM in the mission banks. Whenever ILLIAC requires xcarrier
v , as it does for Carrier CAP or for STEER (home), it consults the* carrier
aircraft’s B1 word for the ATN of the home carrier and, using this to 
compute the address, looks up the carrier's Cl word wherein is stored the 
up-to-date x y . . As long as the home carrier ATN remains
in the aircraft's B1 word, its coordinates can always be ascertained and 
used for Carrier CAP or STEER (home) vectoring.
Steer Vectoring
For use in these discussions the word STEER is to be interpreted 
as "return-to-home-carrier". The coordinates to which a plane is to be 
steered are never confounded by any previous mission coordinates (except 
STEER CRITICAL. See below) so the changes in assignment,
CAP (georef or carrier)—y  STEER  ^
or INC ------- STEER
can always be made simply by setting S^S^—KLO. When the clear picture
word of a friendly aircraft with S, S^ = 10 enters ILLIAC, the computer
looks up the home carrier's Cl bank word, extracts xcarrier Carrier9
computes 0 and R, . , and transmits these to the plane'sp to carrier to carrier
discrete address receiver. It also notifies it to "go home" and indicates 
the "gate" or prescribed approach window.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
C O N F I D E N T I A L 88-45
If, in the first pass through the computer after S.^ has been set to 
STEER, the home carrier is found to he "not receiving", ILLIAC will 
automatically change S ^ S ^ l l  and will execute a STEER CRITICAL processing, 
directing the aircraft to the nearest carrier able to receive him. STEER 
CRITICAL may also be instituted manually if the plane was never previously 
on STEER.
Mission Sequencing
Without manual intervention into ILLIAC*s memory banks the following 
sequences of missions may be executed for friendly aircraft.
Planes designated for possible georef CAP can go from 
CAPGi^ ~INC, CAPq|5-STEER, or CAPq^  STEER CRIT. (if never previously on STEER).
They can also go from
INC^STEER or INC2?STEER CRIT. (if never previously on STEER),
But they cannot return to CAPGR from INC.
Planes designated for possible Carrier CAP can go from 
CAP2?-INC, CAP^STEER, or CAP2?STEER CRIT. (if never previously on STEER), 
and can also go from
INC^STEER, INC3?STEER CRIT. (if never previously on STEER).
Both types of planes are subject to the following STEER rules. Once 
on STEER, no matter what other missions may be successively substituted, 
they can never go to STEER CRITICAL. The only ways to STEER CRITICAL are:
1 . If never before on STEER, plane can be manually placed on 
STEER CRITICAL.
2. If never before on STEER, plane can automatically go to 
STEER CRITICAL on first frame following assignment to STEER, 
if ILLIAC discovers STEER improper because home carrier not 
receiving. This is the only automatic mission assignment 
other than interception*
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OBJECT CLASS CHARACTERISTICS
UHP Aircraft
OOOO
0100
1000
These are the only objects which are automatically threat-evaluated 
and automatically weapon-assigned. Except for having possibly unequal 
thresholds T0000th, TQ100th, T1000th, for weapon assignment, they are 
treated alike by ILLIAC. Any unidentified object, regardless of velocity, 
automatically has the classification 0000 = unidentified aircraft.
To cause an automatic weapon assignment to occur now instead of later,
change
" UNID. ) / T0000 )
HOST. V aircraft’s Threat Number to T0100 'PROB.F.) T1000
respectively.
To effect a manual weapon assignment to weapon whose ATN = Nq, replace
T with N and set bogey’s Sn-^1. If the assigned friend is a gunBogey o 1
(platform), set bogey’s S j+ ’l }  if the assigned friend is a plane, set friend’s
01.
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UHP-Ship, UH-Sub
OOOl
0101
1001
0010
0110
These five classes are treated identically by ILLIAC. They are not 
threat-evaluated. If their ATN = 0 they are ignored. If they are manually 
given an ATN / 0 belonging to any friendly object, ILLIAC will store their 
up-to-date x, y, x and y in the friend's mission bank words, and will vector 
the friend.
UHP-Ship, UH-Sub 
routines,
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Strikee
0111
Strikees may "be either legitimate strike targets or, when specially 
marked, merely FRAME END MARKS. The non-FRAME-MARK Strikee is treated 
identically with UHP-Ship or UH-Sub with one important exception: two
friend’s may be vectored toward it.
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Avoidee
0011 and F-ship 1101 with Sg = 1
The 0011 Avoidee is a special kind of object which has been purposely- 
robbed of its normal class identity in order to give it special treatment. 
The F-ship Avoidee, (1101), on the other hand, gets much of this special 
treatment without losing its class identity as a friendly ship. Both kinds 
can be created by ILLIAC but the candidates can be only Talos targets or 
ships firing guns. Whenever ILLIAC assigns a bogey to a Talos (ship) it 
changes the class of the bogey (0000) to Avoidee (0011), with priority, 
and with temporary Avoidee number of 6k (occupies ATN). Whenever ILLIAC 
assigns a bogey to the Guns of a friendly ship, it gives the ship an 
additional classification, as a non-priority Avoidee. In the case of ships, 
the Avoidee number does not replace the ATN, but resides in .
Avoidees of both kinds are regarded by ILLIAC as areas through which 
friendly aircraft should not be vectored. Whenever ILLIAC detects that 
an interceptor under its control is within the bounds of an Avoidee, it 
transmits vectors away from its center.
There is room in ILLIAC for only six Avoidees and it is only against 
these six that friendly interceptors are tested,* other Avoidees entering 
ILLIAC will be stored as such whenever a vacancy arises or whenever a 
non-priority Avoidee can be displaced with a priority one.
Since control personnel can do (or undo) any of the ILLIAC control 
functions, they, like ILLIAC, can create priority or non-priority Avoidees 
and will be solely responsible for insertion of mountains, weather, or 
similar objects as (0011) Avoidees. Control personnel should consult the 
following summary of rules and suggestions.
* If GUNS is interpreted literally as AA shell-firing artillery, the 
F-ship Avoidee treatment makes some sense. However, if GUNS is taken to 
include AA missiles of short and medium range, it would be more sensible 
to make the target an Avoidee. At the time the program was written, GUNS 
were interpreted literally and the reader is invited to bear in mind that 
the principal goal of the program was to demonstrate some of the kinds of 
control functions that could be performed. It is to be considered more 
as an exhibition than as a recommended model.
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Summary of Meanings and Suggested Usage for 
Avoidee Numbers (A^*s) in JNS Program.
Avoidee (0011): ATN - A* - 0,.., 127
F-ship Avoidee (1101 with SQ = l): ATN i  A ^
A# - 0,.., 7
and may duplicate A^'s already in 
use for (0011) Avoidees.
0011 Avoidee F-ship Avoidee
1101 with Sx = 1_______________________ J_________
if -ft 1! O ILLIAC ignores ii o ILLIAC ignores
A #  = 1, •. .6 ILLIAC has in 
storage
A^ = 1 , .. .6 ILLIAC has in 
storage
t—ii*< ILLIAC has 
bounced it.
Is non-priority
A ^ =  7 Bounced from 
storage by 
ILLIAC
or New Gun WA
or Manually
created
7 < A ^ <  6k 
or
6k <  A# < 127
Manually 
created; not yet 
stored in ILLIAC 
Avoidee banks.
7 <  A ^ Impossible; 
only 5 digits 
available.
DO NOT USE THESE 
NUMBERS EXCEPT 
8. See below.
COII New. Manually 
created.
A~^ "= 6k New. Priority. 
ILLIAC created. 
TAL0S TARGET
A^= 127 Priority Avoidee 
for which ILLIAC 
has no storage 
space
A ^ S  shown here are in decimal notation. For 
Keyset and for reading Clear Picture, use
insertion via 
sexadecimal.
77o cf j  ( o v * r )
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When ILLIAC assigns a bogey (0000) to TALOS it changes the bogey to priority 
Avoidee (0011) (S± = l) with A M  = Aq = ft. to the next pass throng 
ILLIAC, this Avoidee (DA, x, y, priority) Will be stored in Avoidee location 
6^ A 1 ^  1 if possible, whereupon the ATN = Aq = 6k -will give -way to ATN = A^.
If no storage address is available, ATN = A - 6 k  will give way to
a 0ATN = A^ = 127 until storage space is  found.
To make a manual Talos assignment, Set bogey’s class->*0011 (Avoidee), 
bogey’s ATN-*"6k (=U0 sexad.)(use "Bogey paired with ’P ’" switch, which sets), 
bogey’s Sj-^ 1 (priority).
To create a non-priority (0011) Avoidee, Set class-^0011, ATN^ 8  (using 
F-ATN switch which sets S2 = 0, non-priority), ¿ac and Ay, K = 1.
Tto cause an F-ship to become an Avoidee Set S^ = 1 and ATN = 7 (using 
F-ATN switch).
To erase an Avoidee set S,-^ *l. This causes erasure from both ILLIAC and 
TASC. If the track has already died in TASC before manual erasure via Sy  
it can be removed from ILLIAC only if original drum address is known.
dpTherefore, keep a log of DA vs. A during any exercise.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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(Avoidee routines, overleaf)
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FIG. 14 THE AVOIDEE ROUTINES (OOII) AT SS
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8 8 -6 3
¡E R A S E  AVOIDEE
p ! C LA S S IF IC A TIO N
! A T  (D A )cp V IA
S  (27S8)! TA S C IN  W R ITE
U J
j  I M ODE 5
CO
< 1 R E S E T  AVOIDEEoc \ E R A S E  SW ITCH
! T O  "A V O ID E E "
LU
.  Q 1.48 MS.
(6 0 S S )5> ^"FRIEND SURFACE"
1 , T ER A S E  T R A C K 1,
i J  A T  (D A )Cp V IA  !
AVOIDEE j  TA S C IN  W R ITE
i j MODE 4
^5.38 MS. \ !
(23S8)| 135 MS. !
O U T  T O  S P E E D Y  
E N T R Y  O F  MAIN R EA D  
R O U TIN E  A T  IS 7
6.86 MS.
O U T  T O  L E IS U R E  
E N T R Y  T O  MAIN R EA D  
R O U T IN E  A T  S 7
f 6.73 MS. *
'2.54 MS. FROM 
LAST READ
O U T  T O ) L E IS U R E  E N T R Y  T O  M A IN t R E A D  R O U T IN E  A T  S 7 .
VIA 2.25 MS. DELAY AT LHS OF I6S6
FROM  (F E M )ts  
R O U T IN E
(G U N  AVOID EE 
T R E A T M E N T )
( 4 0 S S K 1 
P L A N T  
A D D R E SS E S  
FOR ACCESS 
TO  AVOIDEE 
BANK
A TN  s 6 l S TO R E
. .  1 (DA)s= D A cp CURRENT
r~4.36 MS. X AND Y
--------  © IN BANK
S E T  AVOID EE 
W R ITE  
SW ITC H  T O  
"A V O ID E E "
C L E A R  X T O  0
O U T  T O  L E IS U R E  
E N T R Y  T O  MAIN R EA D  
R O U T IN E  A T  S 7
l ^  5.9 MS.180 MS. FROM 
LAST READ
(D A )S*(DA)CP 
H A S  B E E N  D IS P LA C E D
5.50 MS.-
1.40 MS. FROM- 
LAST READ
S TO R E  X 
IN A(S)
STO R E Y
IN A‘4>
L
12.74 MS. (MAX.)
(3 9 S S )\
f10.78 MS. (MAX.)
( I7 S 8 )
S E T  AVOID EE 
A T N  AN D  
K = l V IA  
T A S C IN  W RITE 
M ODE 3
1.7 MS.
O U T  T O  L E IS U R E  
E N T R Y  T O  MAIN R EA D  
R O U T IN E  A T  S 7
V  »^  3.1 MS.
7.2 MS.
FROM 
LAST READ
"A V O ID E E"
AVOIDEE W R ITE  SW ITCH 
"FR IEN D  S U R "
(3 3 S 8 )
S E T  A V O ID E E #  
K* I
A VOIDEE 
A T  (DA)cp FOR 
FRIEND SURFACE 
V IA  TASCIN 
W R IT E  M ODE 6
S E T  X = 0  
S E T  AVOIDEE 
W RITE SWITCH 
T O  "A VO IDEE"
2.U MS.
O U T  T O  S P E E D Y  
E N T R Y  T O  MAIN R EA D  
R O U T IN E  A T  IS 7
7.6/ MS.
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88-64 C O N F I D E N T I A L
Friend Ship (Surface) and Friend Subsurface
(1101) (1110)
Of these two classes only (1101) can receive an automatic weapon 
assignment, and the assignments will continue to he made hy ILLIAC to 
the friendly ship only so long as S^ = 1; control personnel must make 
the ship available or not available via S^. The ship can be either a 
GUN platform or a TALOS ship but not both. In the first case, whenever 
a GUN weapon assignment is made on an intruding aircraft, the ship’s ATN 
is inserted into the threat number box of the aircraft and the bogey's 
coordinates are broadcast to the ship each time the bogey appears on the 
clear picture. The ship itself is treated as an Avoidee. In the second 
case, a TALOS ship, whenever it is assigned to a bogey, the bogey is made 
into an (0011) Avoidee whose ATN = A ^ A T N ^ ^  SI+IP
An object of either class, F-Ship or F-Sub, will be vectored by ILLIAC 
if its ATN is inserted in the ATN box of some non-friendly object (usually 
not an aircraft.) The mission can be changed readily enough, by simply 
moving the ATN to some other non-friendly object but the ship or sub 
cannot be returned to "do-not-vector" without an intervention into the 
appropriate ILLIAC Bank 2 word.
A Surface Ship does not receive vectors every clear picture frame
if the Weapon Assigner is "on” but, instead, it receives vectors one
1024out of every P times it appears on the Clear Picture. P = — —  and KK
is a settable parameter called the Vectoring Counter Increment. Every 
time a clear picture frame goes by in which there occurs no vectoring 
for the F-Ship in question, K is added to the counter in the Bank 1 
word. When the count reaches 1024, the vectoring alternative will be 
chosen instead of any weapon assignment.
But 1024 in the counter causes vectoring, 
so a practical range for K is 
0 ^ K £  1024
continued next 
page
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C O N F I D E N T I A L 88-65
If K = 16, vectoring occurs once out of 64 frames.
32, ...........................  32
64, ...........................  16
128, ...........................  8
256, ............................  4
512, ...........................  2
1024, vectoring occurs every appearance; 
no WA ever occurs for this ship.
(Friend Surface routines, overleaf)
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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P ig  1 5 .F rie n d  su rfa ce  ro u t in e s  (1101,) a t SL.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MAX TIMES-
(TALOS--WA-VECTOR-NO AVOIDEE-16.90MS MAX) 
(GUN ■ -WA -A VO I  DEE *16.47MS MAX)
(GUN'-VECTOR-AVOIDEE*19.97MS MAX)
FRIEND SUBSURFACE
4.56MS MIN (2.35 MS FROM LA S T  READ)
13.90 MS MAX
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
L A S T  READ
P ig  l6 .G u n  avoidee treatm ent ro u tin e  (a t  60SK).
88-68 
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Carrier
(1010)
Aircraft carriers are treated by the JNS Program at a level of 
sophistication considerably above that for Friend-Surface (1101) class.
They may be vectored, receive fun assignments, furnish aircraft for carrier 
plane assignments, receive (returning) aircraft on STEER and, if so marked, 
be treated as Protectees. They can never be Talos ships nor Avoidees.
Control personnel should heed the following facts and admonitions:
1. Mission Bank 1 word of any carrier must indicate carrier has 
guns even if it really has none available. Without these
Bank 1 marks it can never get a carrier plane WA. Availability 
or lack of guns should be indicated solely by digit S^.
2. When S^ = Sg = 1 (Guns and Planes available) carrier never gets 
vectored while Weapon Assigner is on.
5. The CP Bank word in ILLIAC is 40 digits in 5 blocks of 8; 
each block is a carrier plane ATN plus a zero spacer. As 
these planes are weapon-assigned they are shifted out the 
left end of the register while zeros are shifted in at the 
right hand end. When the left-most block of 8 becomes all 
zeros ILLIAC considers the carrier "empty". Therefore, do 
not put a plane with ATN = 0 in a carrier, for neither it 
nor any plane following it (to the right) will ever receive 
a Carrier Plane Weapon Assignment.
4. A Protectee Carrier must have 1 —  ATN —  4. Non-protectees 
carriers may have 1 ~ ATN —  8 but carriers 1-4 soak up the 
Protectee addresses except for georef Protectees, i.e. can 
have both Carrier ATN = 2 and georef Protectee ATN = 2.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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88-72 C O N F I D E N T I A L
Weapons
Assignment
Switch
Setting
Clear Picture 
Word Carrier 
Weapon Digits
*7 S8
Armament 
Digits in 
Carriers Bank 
1 ILLIAC Stor­
age Word
Computer Action with 
Respect to Vectoring 
and Weapons Assignment
WA Switch 
"OFF"
(No Bogey)
any any Vectoring (if indicated 
by Bank 2)
WA Switch 
"ON" 
(BOGEY)
0 0 
No No 
Guns, Planes
any Vectoring (if indicated 
by Bank 2)
0 1 
No Planes 
Guns,
0 0 
Unarmed
Vectoring (if indicated 
by Bank 2)
0 1 
Gun
or
Plane WA - and vectoring 
(if indicated by Bank 2) 
if Plane WA goes through 
less than 5 of its steps
Plane WA - No vectoring 
(even if indicated by 
Bank 2) if Plane WA goes 
through its 5th step
1 0 • 
Guns, No
Planes
0 0 
Unarmed
Vectoring (if indicated 
by Bank 2)
0 1 
Gun
Gun WA P-1 out of P 
appearances
Vectoring (if indicated 
by Bank 2 ) 1  out of P 
appearances
Gun WA every time if 
"no vectoring" indicated 
by Bank 2
^ ° j TALOS TALOS WA and vectoring (if indicated by Bank 2)
1 1 
Guns, Planes
0 0 
Unarmed
Vectoring (if indicated 
by Bank 2)
0 1 
Gun or
^ ° TALOS
Carrier Plane WA-Gun WA 
(each time) (vectoring 
never)
Figure l8 - Weapons Assignment Rules for Carrier
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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ASSIGNMENT
Pig 1 9 »Carrier plane weapons assignment 
routines at 29SJ.
00
00i
o*
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Friend Aircraft
(1100)
This class is thoroughly discussed in sections of this report dealing 
with weapon assignment, vectoring, CAP and STEER; there are no additional 
facts or warnings which require airing here. Therefore the following is 
merely a terse summary of some Fac characteristics which are discussed in 
earlier sections.
Class 1100 refers only to airborne aircraft, which are tracked and 
appear on the clear picture; decked aircraft are considered as armament 
of their carrier.
Fac are designated by clear picture digits S^S^ as on one of the follow-
CAP 
INCT 
STEER
STEER CRITICAL
CAP planes are available for INTERCEPT assignment. Two kinds of CAP 
are recognized according to the nature of their CAP station; Carrier or 
georef. When assigned to INCT a georef CAP has his x&R yGR wiped out by 
the introduction into the Bank 1 word of the new mission point x^ y^ 
and cannot be returned to station by a simple manipulation of S^Sg.
Carrier CAP can be put through any sequence of CAP, INC, STEER or STEER 
CRIT. except, once on STEER, it cannot go to STEER CRIT.
In testing CAP for possible intercept assignment, ILLIAC checks f o r
gn e e d e d"  ghas where s* W b = gneeded and S3S^S5S6 = ghas (in 16 of
capacity). This ancillary data should be kept up-to-date by personnel.
s1s2= 00 
01 
10 
11
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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(Friend Aircraft routines, overleaf)
C O N F  I D E N T I A L
8 8 -7 6
CO NF ID EN T IAL
(CARRIER A T N  PRESENT)
(C l B A N K  A DDRESS 
PRESENT)
O U T  T O  M ISSION, W A, C A P OF 
F R .A / C  R O U TIN E  ( I IO O ) A T  4 3 S F
FROM  CAP PAR T 
OF F R . A/C 
IF A/C E V ER  (3 IS F ) 
PREVIOUSLY ON 
“S T E E R "
i~3.52MS
FORM 
C 2 B A N K  
ADD RESS 
P L Ä N T  
ACC ESS 
A D D R E S S E S  
T O  Cl AND 
C 2  BANKS
V E C TO R IN G
SUBROUTINE
(C L O S E D )
7.15 MS
4.33MS
- I  1.48 MS
S TO R F
P L A N T Xc a n d
VECTORIN G Yc AS
SUBROUTINE X m Y m
LIN K G A TE
A S  Z m
P L A N T  
LIN K  IN 
B R O A D C A ST 
R O UTIN E 
T O S E N D  
T Y P E  B 
M E SS A G E
(I8 S 9 )-------* - I  1.5 9 MS
(" b r o a d c a s t !
A TN  0
G A T E  
R
T O  P LA N E  I 
M ESSAG E 
T Y P E  B I 
1_ 195 MS J
BROADC AST 1 
A TN (C A R R IE R ) 
A TN  (P LA N E ) 
G A T E « 0  
R T O  
CARRIER 
M ESSAGE 
T Y P E  B 
O U T T O  
MAIN READ  
V IA  I7S6 , 
|_ 2.02MS J
16.06 MS- -13.83MS FROM 
LAST READ
O U T  T O  LE IS U R E  E N T R Y  T O  
M AIN R EA D  R O U TIN E  A T  S 7
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL 8 8 -7 7
17.30 MS MAX- 15.07 MS FROM 
LAST READ
O U T  T O  LE IS U R E  E N T R Y  
T O  MAIN R EAD  R O U TIN E  A T  S7
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P L A N T  
L IN K  IN 
V E C T O R IN G  
R O U T IN E
P L A N T  
LIN K IN 
B R O A D C A S T  
S U B R O U T IN E  
FOR B - T Y P E  
M E SS A G E AND 
S P E E D Y  E N T R Y
16.19 MS.
(5 6 S F )
"II. 59 MS. MAX.
P L A N T  LIN K  
IN V E C T O R IN G  
S U B R O U TIN E
r  16.75 MS.
[ b r o a d c a s t  1 
B -T Y P E  
M E SS A G E  
A T Ne
Z *15
R= 0
T O  P L A N E
j
O U T  T O  S P E E D Y  
E N T R Y  T O  MAIN R EA D  
R O U T IN E  A T  IS 7
^  18.14 MS.
15.19 MS. FROM 
LA S T  READ
S E T
R p _ »B  = 2 55 
Z £ 0  0 £ 0
RE IN I8 S  3
FORM AND 
S TO R E  
( X m  + A X - X )  
M X g  -  X ) 
(Y m  + A Y - Y )  
= ( Y g - Y )
FORM  A N D  
P L A N T  C l 
A N D  C 2  B A N K  
A D D RESSES
6.62 MS.
T E S T
R p -» -b
A G A IN S T
R e
-23.37 MS.
T E S T  C A P  
T Y P E  F R O M  
B A N K  I
(ISST. P A S S )__
T E S T  O O O  O'S 
FROM  Cl B A N K  
(2ND. P A S S )
S T O R E  
0  IN 9
C A P  T Y P E  £ 0
R p - » b  < R e  
E N D  S IG N A L  
R p -» -b  2 R e  
V E C T O R  S IG N A L
9.27 MS. ■
G E O R E F  PT. A T  C E N T E R  (1s t . P A S S ) 
C A R R IE R  R O U T E  (2 N D . P A S S )
C A P  T Y P E  i  0
C A R R IER  A T  
C E N T E R
T E S T  FOR 
(C A R R IE R  A T N ) 
OR  (C l B A N K  
A D D R E S S ) B Y  
S U B T R A C T IN G  128
0
(C A R R IE R  A T N H 2 8  
A / C  W A S N O T  ON  
" S T E E R "  FORM ERLY
@
(C l B A N K  
A D D R E S S ) 
-1 2 8  A/C  
W AS ON 
"S T E E R "  
F O R M E R LY
9.42 MS.
P L A N T  
LIN K  IN 
B R O A D C A S T  
S U B R O U T IN E  
F O R  A - T Y P E  
M E S S A G E  AND 
S P E E D Y  E N T R Y
23.70 MS. -
G E T  B A N K  2 
(1ST. P A S S )
G E T  C 2  BAN K 
( 2 n d . PASS)
[ b r o a d c a s t !
A - T Y P E  ' 
M E S S A G E  
A T N  0 
Z 
R
T O  P L A N E
L_ !— 7—  — _I
25.57 MS.
(23.34 MS. FROM 
LA S T READ)
'26 .0 7 MS. FOR END 
SIGNAL *MESSAGE
O U T  T O  S P E E D Y  
E N T R Y  T O  M AIN R EA D  
R O U T IN E  A T  IS 7
S TO R E  
Y C A S  Y m 
( 2 n d . PASS)
VECTORING AND 
BROAD CA S TINGs9.71 MS. 
S P E E D Y  E N T R Y  T O  
M AIN R E A D  R O U T IN E ' 
A T  IS 7  A T  TO T A L  T IM E :1 
19.24 MS. (GEOREF) MAX\ 
9.53 MS. ( GEOREF)MAX 20.18 MS. (CARRIER) MAX. 
10.47 MS. (CARRIER)MAX 
3.49 MS. MIN. FROM 
LA S T  READ n  O U T  T O  F R . S U R .
1 R O U T IN E  A T  R H S
O F  4 6 S LS E T  
Z m =15 F O R  V E C T O R IN G  
B R O A D C A S T IN G
AN D
T O  S T E E R  P R O C E S S  O F  F R . 
A / C  R O U T IN E  A T  3 IS F  FOR
(R c p ) p  * (R c p ) l
y^ 8 .3 5  MS.
„  w o  S T E E R  V E C T O R  A N D  S P E E D Y  
^ 8 . 7 2  MS. E N T R Y  T O  M AIN R EA D  R O U T IN E  
A T  IS 7
T E S T R E P L A C E (21.96 MS. MAX.)
B O G E Y  OPENING
______ |
B O G E Y  CLOSING
(R c p ) p  NO IM PRO VEM ENT ( R Cp ) p  (R c p )l  
A G A 'N S T  ( R y ) p < ( R CpK  (a (tD A )p ; •(DA). 
(A T N )l
6.35 MS.
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F R O M  F R IE N D  O T H E R  
(H ID  R O U T IN E
IF  F R IE N D  O T H E R  IS 
A  T R E A T E D  
A IR C R A F T  (4 4 S F )-* -' 2.97 MS.
H O  N O T  c t f f p  S «* I> 0 N  IN T E R C E P T  DO N O T  S T E E R  2 _ L _  M|SS|0N
| N Q T * L A S T
A D V A N C E T E S T  FOR
AD D RESS. L A S T
O F  A(P A V O ID E E
(S A FE 
FROM 
A L L  ' 
AVOIDEES)
— (6 2 S F )
A D V A N C E  
A, r  
&.
A1?1 
A D D R E S S E S
L A S T
U.85 MS. MAX.
T E S T
l ( X - X A|) ls
IA X I
A G A IN S T  (AX)a,
IA X I ì ( A X ) a i  
S A F E  *"~ 
I A X I < ( A X ) a i
M AY BE IN 
D A N G E R
G E T  AND 
P L A N T  
A C C E S S  
A D D R E S S E S  
T O  B A N K S  
I A N D  2
3.94 MS. J
R E A D  AND 
S T O R E  F U E L  
S T A T U S ,Gh a s  
IN I
F R O M  P R O T E C T E E  (1011) R O U T IN E  
F O R  A IR C R A F T  P R O T E C T E E
(9 3 S F )~
3.67 MS.
-END MODE 3 
AT 3.67MS.
S E T  A C C E S S  
A D D R E S S E S  
T O  B AN KS 
I A N D  2
UNPACK AND  
S T O R E  X M, X M, 
Y m ,Y m , Z M
S TO R E  XGr A S  
X m (1s t . P A S S )
S T O R E  X C A S  
X M ( 2 n d  P A S S )
T E S T  
l (Y * Y Aj)l = 
I A Y I  
A G A IN S T  
( A Y ) a i
IA Y I í ( A Y ) a ¡
S A F E
I A Y K ( A Y ) a |
IN D A N G E R  W ITH  
A V O ID E E  A i
a IN I7 S 3
C O M P U TE  
Rp - » b O O % ) 
a  Rp -* b
A X  £ at Rp- » b ^ B 
A  Y  = a R p - » B  T B
S T O R E
(C AR R IER  A T N )  
OR
(C l B AN K 
A D D R E S S )
S E T S W ITC H
IN -R . S U R .
T O R E T U R N
T O FR. A/C
>•- 4.26 MS.
G O  T O  FR. SUR. 
R O U T IN E  AN D  
C O M P U T E  R p * b (10%)
.94 MS.
5.20 MS.
G E T  9 FROM  
BAN K 2 A N D  
FORM  G n e e d e d -  
gRp-»B
G E T  B A N K  I 
IN R) (1s t . P A S S )
G E T  Cl B A N K  IN R| 
(2 N D  P A S S )
G n * 0
C A N  T  M AK E 
IN T E R C E P T
CO M P A RE C O M P A R E
G NEEDED G NEEDED
T O 0 T O  G h a s
W A O F F
9.74 MS. J
. SIÎT
S| ■ S 2 i  0
■8.72 MS. MAX.
■6.35 MS.
Gn  2 G h  C A N 'T  M AKE IN T E R C E P T
G n < G h  C A N  M AKE IN T E R C E P T
W A ON
W E A P O N  A S S IG N M E N T  
S W ITC H
CONFIDENTIAL
CON FIDENTIAL
00 
001
00o
(S N )
E N T R Y  -
O .O O M sf -  
(RELATIVE  
TIME)
P L A N T
L IN K
F O R N I A N D  
S T O R E  
A X s (X M- X ) 2f' 
A Y = ( Y m - Y ) 2 18
18
F O R N I
B
c . W
8 + 8
3.0 3MS
F O R N I A N D  
S T O R E
IA X I +  IA Y I
F O R N I A N D  
S T O R E  
$ ( IA X I  +  IA Y I )
F O R N I A N D  
S T O R E
R f .* M3 | A X I+ IA Y I  
I A X I I A Y I  
ç ( l A X H - I A Y I )
© T E S T
IA Y I2 IA X I - I A Y I
0 I A Y K I A X I
@  A Y = 0
0AY*O
A X - A Y
0 A X < O © A X > 0 © A Y > 0 © A Y <  O
F O R N I 
A+ BC , W
8 + 8
F O R M
« ' ■ S ( a + c B |W | ) F O R M°  \ L  , VV /
8 M 8 I
0 S 0  +  0 '
(RELATIVE TIM E) 
7.15 MS MAX
O U T
FIG. 22 THE CLOSED VECTORING SUBROUTINE AT SN \
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Protectee
( 1011)
The class called Protectee is a group of four or less objects with 
respect to which bogey threats are evaluated.
If it is only the protectee characteristics which are wanted -
then any object, real or imaginary, can be made into a Protectee, clfcSs 
1011. However, if certain other operational characteristics are desired 
of a Protectee, such as weapon assignment and vectoring, the object 
must be an actual aircraft or surface vessel. (When a carrier is also 
a protectee, it is carried as class CARRIER (1010) with Sg = 1.)
When a Protectee is indicated as an aircraft (S^S^ =10) it can be 
arranged to receive periodic vectors to reach a station and hold an 
orbit, either with respect to a carrier or a georef point. See pp. 
281-282 of R-7^. Control personnel cannot place an aircraft Protectee 
on STEER by manipulation of but must employ a special intervention
into the ILLIAC memory. Furthermore, no aircraft Protectee can receive 
a weapon assignment.
A surface Protectee ( S ^  =11), on the other hand, can receive a 
GUN or TAL0S assignment, but the ship itself is never made into a 
Protectee nor can control personnel indicate availability or non­
availability for these assignments merely by manipulating S^. If done 
at all, it must be by manipulation of the armament digits in the Bank 
1 Word. Otherwise it possesses all of the properties of a normal 
Friend-Ship (1101).
Because the R (10 °/o) approximation is employed for calculating the, 
threat number term AT^ = C^ (R - R), the Protectee is surrounded 
effectively not by an imaginary circle of radius Rq but by an imaginary 
octagon. If the reader will refer to Fig. 23 he will find a comparison 
of R (10 °/o) vs T5ae 1ocus of positions around some center
which appear (by 10 °/o approximation) to be equidistant from that center 
is not a circle but an octagon smaller than the circle.
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Friend Other = Ignoree
(1111)
This classification is intended for tracked objects -which are in 
no way desired to enter any of the weapon assignment routines. Generany 
they would be ignored by ILLIAC but it is possible to provide them with 
automatic vectors if the control personnel desire. This may be accomplished 
by inserting the Friend Other ATM into another track such as an artificial 
STRIKEE. Obviously, in that circumstance, the ATN of the Friend Other must 
not duplicate the ATN of any other friendly object in the system whereas, 
if it is merely to be ignored, there is no such restriction.
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Appendix I
Illiac Memory Bank Word Contents for the Various Classes
The information on tracked objects which is stored in ILLIAC includes 
specific characteristics of the 128 friendly objects which can be controlled. 
It contains such things as the object's weapon strength, pursuit range, 
state of readiness, present mission and, for the aircraft, the address or 
"name" of the home carrier. Of the approximately 300 memory locations 
available in ILLIAC for such storage, 256 of these are used for storing 
information on the missions of each of the 128 friendly, controlled objects, 
Each of these 128 objects has a unique Assigned Track Number (ATN) which 
serves not only the control personnel as a name for the track, but also as 
an address in ILLIAC for locating the pertinent memory bank words. 
Distribution of ILLIAC memory space as used in the JNS program is shown in 
Fig. 3 and summarized in Fig. 4 taken from R-T^» The exact contents of 
these words are shown here in Appendix I in a series of figures taken from 
R-7^.
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Appendix II
Weapon Assignment Priorities
Each of the control parameters may be set independently by the 
control personnel and can be chosen in such a way as to establish priorities 
among the four weapon types.
If it is desired, the priority may be made absolute so that, regardless 
of range, a certain weapon type, if available, will always be chosen over 
any other. As an example, it may be arranged that, when available,a CAP 
will always be assigned before a carrier plane, a carrier plane before a 
TALOS, a TALOS before a gun. Such an absolute priority scale is possible
because of the very wide range in available a ’s as compared to the relatively
. -1 -21 narrow range of possible R *s. Any may be chosen between ±2 and ±2
while any R . must lie in the range 1 mile ^  R ^  511 miles and is carriedC X -| ^  1 Cq
as a scaled number in ILLIAC as 2 ^  R = 2 .
In R-7^; JNS suggests the use of
which will give
c
aP
orH 
' 
1CVJ1
' 
I. (CAP)
o-21 *a = -2cp (Carrier
at II r
o t ro H (TALOS)
a = 2 -10 ("GUNS")g
-2''19  = (M)p ^ -2“28
-2",3° = (FM)cp ^  -2“39
2“^  = (FM)t = 2“50 
2“28 = (FM)g = 2“19
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Now while certainly permissible, it is not necessary to employ such 
widely differing a's, even to achieve an effective absolute priority. It 
will be instructive to plot (FM)^ v s . Range for the four different weapon 
types, for inspection of these graphs provides a ready insight to the 
possibilities and limitations inherent in this method of assigning weapons. 
Figure II A is such a plot and resembles the result would would be obtained 
using Snyder values for except that the value scale has been drastically 
narrowed and an absolute priority scale is not quite achieved.
In this graph, "GUNS” are considered to be conventional AA guns as 
well as missiles such as tartar and highly advanced terrier types which are 
given a maximum assignment range of 30 miles. Carrier planes on deck have 
been arbitrarily allowed a minimum range of 50 miles because the time required 
to climb to combat altitude severely limits their close-in usefulness. In 
the JNS program no special provision exists for gaining altitude during an 
interception. The vectoring routines direct the interception toward a 
pseudo-collision point as if there were no altitude separation to be closed; 
the interceptor is directed on a nearly straight course in the case of nearly 
head-on interceptions. Since bogey altitude is not considered at time of 
weapon assignment, the minimum assignment range should be more like 100 
miles for carrier planes. Talos and CAP in turn have minimum assignment 
ranges; TALOS, because of the time required for fire control lock-on and 
computations, launching manipulations, and initial flight control; CAP 
because of time required to turn toward the bogey. Now the Rc's are, for 
all weapons except TALOS, merely the present range from the weapon to the 
ftogey, causing the (FM)^ to be a linear function of range, a function whose 
value is zero when range is zero. Talos' R^ is also a linear function but 
it drops to zero at maximum range. Because of the existence of minimum 
ranges below which some R^’s are not defined, the (FM) plots for TALOS and 
CAP, for example, appear as dashed lines for all ranges less than 55 and 
15 miles respectively. The particular values we have chosen for the minimum
* If rate of climb is 5000 ft/min. and speed is 500 knots during climb, while 
bogey velocity is 600 knots, *4-5 miles would be closed between deck launched 
interceptor and bogey before interceptor reached 15,000 feet flying a straight 
course; 120 miles for 1*0,000 feet. At any rate, ht> matter what course the 
interception takes to reach *40,000 feet, the bogey will advance 80 miles 
during this time.
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ranges may not be operationally correct. For the discussion in hand that 
is of no importance just so long as they exist.
Examination of the graph yields some interesting facts. An absolute 
priority scale has nearly been established even with a very small range of 
a^. From 0-15 miles aiLy Guns can accept an assignment. From 15 miles out to 
70 miles there is a possibility of assigning either CAP or TALOS, the CAP 
(FM)Ts in the range 15-55 miles being equal to certain TALOS (FM)’s in the 
range 55-72 miles. If the TALOS ship is more than 72 miles from the bogey,
CAP will always receive the assignment regardless of its own distance to 
the bogey provided it lies within the permitted limits. If CAP is not 
available, TALOS will surely receive the assignment, since its whole curve 
lies lower than any portion of those of the other two weapons.
By making use of the maximum and minimum assignment ranges for the 
different weapon types, and the possibility for positive or negative slopes, 
one can easily adjust the (FM) graphs to give several kinds of priority scales, 
some of which are functions of range, and others which are absolute. It is 
apparent that the latter type may be achieved even with a ’s which are in the 
ratio of small numbers. An illustration of this is provided by the graph 
of Figure II A if the following slight changes are made: 1. Change TALOS
curve to intersect that of CAP at 15 instead of 5^ miles. 2. Lower the
slope of the Gun curve until at range R ^  the value of (FM)^ is just lower 
than the value of (FM) at minimum carrier range. The resulting a ’s, giving 
absolute priority of CAP over TALOS, TALOS over CARRIER PLANES, CARRIER 
PLANES over GUNS, would become
a = -2a P cp
a, = -.55a> t cp
ag +1 .5acp
An alternative arrangement which appears a little more attractive than 
the one just proposed is illustrated in Figure II B and is based on the 
following assumptions, considerations, and preferences.
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1. From 0-15 miles no weapons other than "GUNS" are available.
2. For 15-50 miles ranges both "GUNS" and CAP may be considered 
effective, with the former preferred because of the need for maximum speed 
and ability to close an altitude differential in a matter of seconds.
5. For 50-50 mile ranges both TAL0S and CAP are possible choices, 
with TAL0S preferred; CAP may not be able to turn or climb fast enough 
to close this short range.
b. For 50-100 mile ranges, CAP, TAL0S, and CARRIER (decked) 
planes are all possible choices, listed in order of probable preference.
A manned interceptor, given sufficient running time to reach combat altitude, 
and benefiting from both surface-based tracking radar and A.I. lock-on radar 
may be more effective than a long range missile. Either of these appear to 
have an advantage over a decked aircraft up to 100 miles.
5. From 100 miles to maximum intercept range, the deck-launched 
plane has sufficient time to climb to even high altitude, and has a greater 
range potential than a CAP who has already expended some fuel on patrol.
The choice of a's employed in constructing Figure II B provide for the 
considerations listed above. Such a choice has the following specific 
characteristics.
a. If there is any "GUN" between about 4* and 50 miles from the 
"bogey, the assignment will always go to the "GUN". If there is no GUN in 
this range, but there is one closer (0-4 miles) the assignment may go to 
either the GUN or to a distant TAL0S or CAP.
b. If the bogey lies within 55 to 50 miles of a TAL0S ship,
TAL0S will be assigned before any available CAP regardless of the CAP’S 
distance to the bogey. If no TAL0S ship lies closer than 50 miles to the 
bogey the assignment may go to either CAP or TAL0S if both are within 
striking range. A 50-mile CAP is considered equivalent to a 100-mile TAL0S, 
a 60-mile CAP to an 80-mile TALOS, a 68-mile CAP to a 68-mile TAL0S. Range
for range, the CAP has the preference between 50 and 68 miles, the TAL0S 
between 68 and 100 miles.
This "4" may be readily changed to some preferred value by changing the 
slope of the GUN" curve. If a_ = -Ha., N can be anything greater than" e.  Ng c
6.7 without disturbing the priorities. The lower the N, the greater the 
minimum GUN range for absolute priority. If N = 6.7, this minimum increases to about 10 miles.
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c. Beyond 100 miles, CAP has absolute priority up to its maximum 
range (which might be set at about 120-150) after which carrier planes assume 
absolute priority.
Appendix III 
The Control Parameters
Various constants such as interceptor fuel consumption per round- 
trip mile, maximum missile range, weighting constants for weapon assignment 
priority scaling, and many (21) others must be chosen by control personnel 
and stored in ILLIAC for computer use in the control program routines. A 
reasonable set of values for these constants is shown below.
Control
Parameter
Assigned
Value
Control
Parameter
Assigned
Value
R0 100 miles at -2-20
Tooooth 100 ag t
o 1 H ON
rgm 60,000 yds (Ax)t 8
T0100th 100 -P
1
8
rtm 90 miles (A)q 8
T1000th 100 k 6k
RTm 50 miles ZG 00,000 feet
(A T)s 1 rg 40,000 yds
CR a-? rcpm 200 miles
cv 1 Rrt_CPm 50 miles
aP
HOJ1OJ1 a{VeeT*> r om 0 0 /S'0
ac r
o 1 ro
re 8 miles
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Appendix III cont’d
On the next two pages is a table showing the storage locations 
in ILLIAC and the form of insertion for the 2k control parameters. 
Many of them are inserted as scaled numbers in order to get two of 
them into a single ILLIAC ^0-digit word, and the scaling factor, if 
present, is shown as a multiplier for the control parameter in the 
column labeled."Form of Word”. A scaling factor of 2 n has the effect 
of shifting the binary point to right of the 2~n digit of the normal, 
ILLIAC word.
Normal ILLIAC Word
0 - 2,
Z Z z
A
- 3 5 i'n& ir y  'F a ' n i "
-»S / ^ n ‘ C C
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Appendix III
The Control Parameters as Stored in the Control Parameter
Bank at S3
Location of Word 
In ILLIAC Memory 
(Using S3) 
(Decimal) 
(Sexadecimal)
Form
of
Word
Definitions and Restrictions
0S3
(to)
2-l 8 R0 + R = Threat Radius in miles0 o *  rq ^  511
(029) 2 ^ Tooooth Tnnnnth = Threat Threshold for Un­identified Aircraft
° -  Tooooth - 127
1S3 2-18 R +rqm R = Maximum Gun Weapons Assignment Distance in miles
(to) 2 59 T0100th 0 — R 4=. 511GM
(02k ) Tm n n th = Threat Threshold for Foe 
U1UU Aircraft
0 *  Toiooth - 127
2S3
(“O)
2 ' 1 8  +
2 55 T1000th
R__ = Maximum Talos Weapons Assignment 
Distance in miles
° ~
(02s) T100nth = Threat Threshold for Pro­
bable Friend Aircraft
0 ^  T th 4z 127 1000 '
3S3
m
(02N)
2 - 1 8  +
2-59 (A T )g 
j? ò e  i
T^lm = M^n -^muni Talos Weapons Assign­
ment Distance in miles
(A T )q = Threat Increment for Sizerr^ r rr^ rn39 iß °
*5
0 ^ ( A T ) s * (2 20 + 219. . . .2 ° )
4 S3 
(*5)
(02 j)
2”2^ c
V-------- ------------>
C = Threat/mile inside threat 
Radius Rq
0 ^  0^ 4: (221 + 220 +...2° + 2"1 ...2“1^
—  Scaling factor. Multiply absolute value by scaling
factor for insertion into ILLIAC.
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5S3
(W)
(02F)
2-39 cv C,T = Threat/ mile of closing 1.5 sec
velocity . 
0 ^ Cy ^ (2^  + 2^ ......2°j
6s3
(**7)
(02L)
0£»p a = Weapons Assignment Weighting 
Factor for Airborne Planes
2"21^ |ap A  2“1
7 S3
(W)
(030)
j
ac a»G = Weapons Factor 
Decks
2-21¿
Ass
for
(XC
ignment Weighting 
Aircraft on Carrier
A 2“1
8S3
(031)
aT a = Weapons Ass Factor for
2-21¿  ja*
»ignment Weighting 
Talos Ships
A 2"1
9S3
(50)
(032)
aG a = Weapons Factor
2-21¿
AS£
for
aG
»ignment Weighting 
Gun Platforms
A 2“1
10 S3 
(033)
2-38 (Ax )t +
2"41 (Ay)T
(Ax) , (Ay) = Standard Avoidance 
Distances for Talos 
Targets in miles
0 é (Ax)-, (Ay) é. 56 in multiples 
T T of 8
11S3
(52)
(03*0
f
Binary point lies 
2 places to right 
of register
' |ö|o|o|/|eM« 1. =8
(A)G = (Ax )g =• (Ay)G = Standard
Avoidance Distance for Ships with 
Guns Engaged in miles
0 A  (A) A 56 in multiples of 8
G ^ ___ — ----------^
1x8, 2x8, 3x8, ^x8,
l«lol'U>M- M .
W l'U |olcl°L =zy
I |/|g|g|4 l^|t - 52 .
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12 S3 
(53) 
(035)
2-59 k k = Vector counter increment for Friend 
Surface Routines.
If: k = l6, weapons axsignment 63 
times, vectoring once, 
every 6b appearances
k = 32, weapons assignment 31 
times, vectoring once, 
every 32 appearances
k = 6k} weapons assignment 15 
times, vectoring once, 
every 16 appearances
k =128, weapons assignment 7
times, vectoring once, 
every 8 appearances
etc.
13S3(5*0
(036)
2-59 Zq Z_ = Vertical Gun Ranges in miles G
0 ^ z_ ^  63G
li+S3
(55)
(037)
2-18 rg R_ = Horizontal Gun Range in miles G
0 R_ ^ 511G
15S3
(56)
2‘18 RCPM RCpM = Maximum Carrier Plane Weapons Assignment Distance in miles
(038) 0 ^  R 3= 511 CPM J
l 6s3 2' 18 RCPm RCPm = Carrier Plane Weapons Assignment Distance in miles
(039) 0 - RCPm^ 511
17S3
(58)
(03K)
ac. a = Aircraft Pseudo-collision Course 
Vectoring Parameter in (1.5 
seconds)/(mile) = 1
miles/l.5 seconds
0 ^  a <  l6 corresponding to velocities 
v„ of 150 Knots to O O
if a ■= i—„ (effectively) 
vf
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18S3
(59)
= Intercept Vectoring End 
Distance in miles
(033) 0 ^  Rg ^  511
The limits given above are not imposed by the physical variability 
on the various quantities but by the way in which these quantities 
enter into the program. In all cases the limits given will embrace 
the possible ranges over which the respective quantities can vary.
Normal ILLIAC values
Values when scaling 
-14-factor 2 is used
„ -i .3 .*/
Z 2 2 2
l£  /  2 1 i i  I z 'u
Pe>)»T
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Appendix IV 
SEMI-SNYDS to DEGREES
In output messages from ILLIAC to various controlled objects, angles 
are expressed in a special unit called the semi-snyd.
(1 semi-snyd = of a circle = 1.4o6° ) . For the convenience of control
personnel the following short table of sexadecimal-semi-snyds-to-degrees is 
presented.
Semi-
Snyds
(Sexa)
Degrees
(DEC) cos 0 SIN 0
Semi-
Snyds
(Sexa)
Degrees
(DEC) COS 0 SIN ©
01 001 1.000 .018 31 O69 .358 •93^
03 0 0 k .998 .070 33 072 .309 • 951
05 007 .993 .122 35 075 .259 .966
07 010 .985 .174 37 077 .225 .97^
09 013 .9 7  k .225 39 080 .174 .985
OS 015 .966 .259 3S 083 .122 •993
OJ 018 .951 .309 3J 086 .070 .998
OL 021 .93^ .358 3L 089 .018 1.000
11 02*4- .914 .407 41 091 .018 1.000
13 027 .891 .454 43 094 .070 .998
15 030 .866 .500 45 097 .122 .993
17 032 .848 .530 47 100 .174 .985
19 035 .819 .57^ 49 103 .225 .974
is 038 .788 .616 4s 105 .259 .966
i j Okl .755 .656 4j 108 .309 .951
1L okk .719 .695 4l 111 .358 .93^
21 0 k6 .695 .719 51 114 .407 .914
23 049 .656 .755 53 117 .454 .891
25 052 .616 .788 55 120 .500 .866
27 055 .57^ .819 57 122 .530 .848
29 058 .530 .848 59 125 .57^ .819
2S 060 .500 .866 5S 128 .616 .788
2J 063 .454 .891 5J 131 .656 .755
2L 066 .407 •914 5L 134 .695 .719
j
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Appendix IV 
Continued
Semi-
Snyds
(Sexa)
Degrees
(DEC) COS 9 SIN 9
Semi-
Snyds
(Sexa)
Degrees
(DEC) COS 9 SIN 9
6l 136 .719 .695 K1 226 .695 «719
63 139 • 755 .656 K3 229 .656 «755
65 l42 .788 .616 K5 232 .616 .788
67 145 .819 .57^ K7 235 • 57^ .819
69 148 .848 .530 K9 238 .530 .848
6s 150 .866 .500 KS 240 .500 .866
6j 153 .891 .454 KJ 243 .454 .891
6l 156 •914 .407 KL 246 .407 • 914
71 159 ■ 93b .358 SI 249 •358 .93^
73 162 •951 «309 S3 252 .309 «951
75 165 .966 «259 S5 254 .276 .961
77 167 ■ 91b .225 S7 257 .225 •91b
79 170 .985 .174 S9 260 .174 .985
7S 173 «993 .122 ss 263 .122 «995
7J 176 .998 .070 SJ 266 .070 .998
7L 179 1.000 .018 SL 269 .018 1.000
81 181 1.000 .018 N1 271 .018 1.000
83 184 .998 .070 N3 274 .070 .998
85 187 • 993 .122 N5 277 .122 .993
87 190 .985 .174 N7 280 .174 .985
89 193 ■91b .225 N9 283 .225 .97^
8s 195 .9 66 «259 NS 285 «259 .966
8j 198 «951 .309 NJ 288 .309 .951
8l 201 .93^ .358 NL 291 .358 ■93b
91 204 .914 .407 J 1 294 .407 .91b
93 207 .891 .454 J3 297 .454 .891
95 209 .875 .485 J5 299 .485 .875
97 212 .848 «530 J7 302 «530 .848
99 215 .819 ■ 31b J9 305 .57^ .819
9s 218 .788 .6l6 JS 308 .616 .7 88
9J 221 «755 .656 JJ 311 .656 «755
9L 224 «719 .695 JL 314 .695 .719
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Appendix IV 
Continued
Semi-
Snyds
(Sexa)
Degrees
(DEC) COS 9 Sin 9
Semi-
Snyds
(Sexa)
Degrees
(DEC) COS 9 Sin 9
FI 316 .719 .695 LI 339 .93^ .358
F3 319 •755 .656 L3 342 .951 .309
F5 322 .788 .616 L5 344 .961 .276
FT 325 .819 •57^ L7 347 .97^ .225
F9 328 .848 .530 L9 350 .985 .174
FS 330 .866 .500 LS 353 • 993 .122
FJ 333 .891 .454 LJ 356 •998 .070
FL 336 .914 .407 LL 359 1.000 .018
Appendix V
Conversion Table for Sexadecimal-- Decimal
To use the table for finding the decimal equivalent of a sexadecimal 
number, observe that the decimal numbers are assembled in a square matrix, 
each little box containing either a printed or implied decimal number. They 
read in order from left to right •within each horizontal row.
The rows are defined by pairs of sexadecimal characters found outside 
each row to the left or right, while the columns are defined by single 
sexadecimal digits found above or below and outside the matrix.
For conversion of numbers, the whole chart should be considered as split 
into two charts by the heavy black vertical centerline, and for any one 
conversion only one-half of the chart is considered. To find the decimal 
equivalent of 0N2, notice that the first two digits (ON) of (0N2) are in the 
left hand outside column; this defines the row in which the decimal equiva­
lent will be found. Next, look for the least significant digit (2) of (0N2) 
in the left half of the top or bottom outside row. This defines the column. 
Notice that row (ON) intersects left hand column (2) at decimal box (195) 
which is the answer required.
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00
02
04
06
08
OK
ON
OF
10
12
14
16
18
IK
IN
IF
20
22
24
26
28
2K
2N
2F
30
32
34
36
38
3K
3N
3F
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 K S N J  F L O  I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 K S N J F L
0 5 10 15 20 2 5 3 0
3 5 4 0 4 5 5 0 55 6 0
6 5 70 7 5 8 0 8 5 9 0 9 5
100 105 110 115 120 125
130 135 140 145 150 153
160 165 170 175 180 185 190
195 20 0 20 5 210 215 2 2 0
225 230 235 24 0 245 25 0 255
2 6 0 2 6 5 27 0 27 5 2 8 0 285
29 0 295 300 30 5 310 315
320 3 2 5 3 3 0 335 3 4 0 34 5 3 5 0
3 5 5 3 6 0 36 5 370 375 3 8 0
385 390 39 5 400 405 410 415
42 0 425 43 0 43 5 4 4 0 44 5
45 0 455 46 0 4 6 5 4 7 0 475
4 8 0 485 4 9 0 495 500 5 0 5 51 0
515 5 2 0 5 2 5 5 3 0 5 3 5 5 4 0
5 4 5 5 5 0 55 5 5 6 0 5 6 5 5 7 0 57 5
58 0 5 8 5 59 0 595 6 0 0 6 0 5
610 615 620 625 630 63 5
6 4 0 64 5 6 5 0 655 6 6 0 665 6 7 0
675 6 8 0 685 6 9 0 6 9 5 7 0 0
7 0 5 - 710 715 720 725 7 3 0 735
74 0 745 7 5 0 7 5 5 7 6 0 , 7 6 5
770 7 7 5 7 8 0 785 7 9 0 79 5
8 0 0 8 0 5 810 815 8 2 0 8 2 5 8 3 0
8 3 5 84 0 8 4 5 85 0 8 5 5 860
8 6 5 87 0 8 75 * 8 8 0 88 5 8 9 0 895
9 0 0 90 3 910 915 92 0 925
930 * 93 5 9 40 9 4 5 9 5 0 95 5
9 6 0 9 6 5 970 975 9 8 0 9 8 5 9 9 0
9 9 5 1000 003 1010 1015 I02C
01
03
05
07
09
OS
OJ
OL
11
13
15
17
19
IS
IJ
IL
21
23
25
27
29
2S
2J
2L
31
33
35
37
39
3S
3J
3L
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 K S N J F  L O  I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 K S N J  F Li
SEXIDECIMAL TO DECIMAL CHART
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Appendix VI
ILLIAC Outputs to the Discrete 
Address Command Link
The aspect of the information sent (’’Broadcast”) by the control computer to the various
operational objects is shown below. The discrete address receiver corresponding to the assigned
track number (ATN) of the operational object concerned will respond and display the message
following the ATN. The message type digit (0 = A-type, 1 = B-type will also be displayed).
Cornfield personnel should remember to give all CAP a Z = 3 in order to allow them to receive
messages (peculiarity of DAR's). Also avoid a Gate of L or 0 for Carrier; this avoids confusion
between STEER and Avoidee messages since R is not received by our BAR'S, 
o 
o
•3
H
W
m
S3
H
g
KCÇ
Is
; fc ATN of DRUM ADDRESS x OF BOGEY y OF BOGEY Z 
£  GUN PLATFORM OF BOGEY 0^.x.i 5 H  0 4 y ±  511 0
BOGEY
OF BOGEY BOGEY TYPE 
^ Z é. 15 CLASS (= 0 HERE)
8<
cr
1
7 7 7 T T
1___  __ . .r1 i T T T T T " I N I i
Gun Message to 3
iS
j Ö  ATN OF 
*^  TALOS SHIP
friend Surface on each appearance of Bog
x OF BOGEY
DRUM ADDRESS OF BOGEY 0 ^  x ^ 5 H
ey (all distances in miles)
y OF BOGEY Z OF BOGEY 
0 ^  x ^ 511 0 ^ Z ^  15
BOGEY
CLASS
BOGEY
TYPE
l L i n  1U  11 h  j j _ i  i i i il r r r _LL__L
TALCS message to Friend Surface once on TALCS weapons assignment (all distances in miles)
o
o
s*
H
Ü
«-a
H 
fc» 
tH
88-112
g g ATN OF 
I g FRIEND AIRCRAFT
BOGEY
CLASS
BOGEY
TYPE
— —  ■■■■■■»■
1 z l l I L L
Initial Weapons Assignment to Friend Aircraft 
(either airborne or on carrier deck)
S I 5 ATN
^  OF OPERATIONAL
OBJECT CONCERNED — *------ ■---- >■ ■<
0 = BEARING TO/ Z HEIGHT (
MISSION of MISSION
o 
o
H UÖ Q pq
W SS Ww 0L«* i Et-3 
H  
>  
t-»
0 ^ 0  ¿.255 \0 it Z ¿15 Oé R é 255
R = Range to Mission
Vector Message to
1
Friend Surface on Vector 
Carrier on Vector 
Friend Aircraft on Intercept Mission
ATN OF 9=BEARING TO CARRIER/ CARRIER / R
FRIEND AIRCRAFT 0 ^ 9 é. 255 / GATE
Range to Carrier
— --------------— ------------ — ------------------------------- — < - ------------ j * - --------------------------------
1
o
o
«
H
Ü
W
«
1-3
H
!*»
t-»
Steer Message to Friend Aircraft
ATN OF CARRIER
ATN of FRIEND 
AIRCRAFT BEING 
STEERED
R = RANGE TO FRIEND 
AIRCRAFT BEING STEERED 
(BLANKj 0 ± R  ¿255
0 0 0 0
Steer Message to the Carrier toward which a Friend Aircraft 
is being vectored
88-115
wo <$<i Ira w
ATN OF
FRIEND AIRCRAFT Characteristic Intercept End Signal
— «**----------------------- — < -------------
-
-------------v -
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
range from mission has been reached,
o
o
53
H
t)
dd
3
H
S n  
3 W ATN OF
FRIEND AIRCRAFT
© = BEARING DUE 
AWAY FROM AVOIDEE 
0 * © £ 255- Characteristic Avoidee Signal
■
----------- ----------- -----------
l l ___ l l . l _ . l _ L .
0000 0 o l o  0
Avoidee Message sent to Friend Aircraft when it enters the 
avoidance area.
^ B "
Q=BEARING TO CAP R=RANGE TO CAP
g fc ATN OF REFERENCE POINT Characterist ic REFERENCE POINT
S ^  FRIEND AIRCRAFT 0 ^ 9  £.255 \ CAP S i g n a l ^ 0 R 255---------- -*■ =------ ------ *-r
0 JL _LL ill 1..
Message sent to Friend Aircraft while it is on CAP 
unless previously on STEER
oo
CDiHH4=-
O
O
53
hrj
M
tJ
M
m
H
!t*
f
In the above, ranges(R) and heights (Z) are in miles. Bearing angles (0) are in 
256th’s of a circle.
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Appendix VII
Manual Intervention into the Control Program
Part A. Summary of the Standard Intervention Modes.
Intervention 
Mode Selector 
Switch I
"Number of Digits 
to be Head" 
Switch
Action
0 - None— Reserved to mean "No 
Intervention"
1 1 Turn Threat Evaluation ON
2 1 Turn Threat Evaluation OFF
3 1 Turn Weapons Assignment ON
1 Turn Weapons Assignment OFF
5 1 Turn Intercept Vectoring ON
6 1 Turn Intercept Vectoring OFF
7 1 Turn Vector Broadcasting ON 
or OFF
8 Ik Head a word and an address from 
the Intervention Rack. Plant the 
word at the address in the ILLIAC 
Memory. See illustrative examples 
in Part B and Part C below
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Part B. Special Alterations of the Control Program using Intervention 
Mode 8 (see Part A above) (all numbers are expressed sexa- 
decimally)
1- The program can be set to ignore all members of a given class 
(•whether or not the members of the class are marked "ILLIAC" or 
"MANUAL" via the status digit S^q .)
Class
To Ignore the Class To Return to Normally Processing 
the Class
Address Word Address Word
0000 
UN A/C
o4n 2607F 00000 O^N 56o6f26os4
0001 
UN SUR
O^J 2607F 00000 o k j L50032607J
0010 
UN SUB
OkF 2607F 00000 OkF L50052607J
0011
AVOIDEE
OkL 2607F 00000 OkL 560NN220NN
0100 
FOE A/C
050 2607F 00000 050 360732603^
0101 
FOE SUR
051 2607F 00000 051 L30032607J
0110 
FOE SUB
052 2607F 00000 052 L50032607J
0111
STRIKES
053 2607F 00000 053 5610F26ii8
1000 
PF A/C
05^ 2607F 00000 05^ 360782 60 Sk
1001 
PF SUR
055 2607F 00000 055 L30032607J
1010
CARRIER
056 2607F 00000 056 iK)00026225
i
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1100 
FR A/C
057 2607F 00000 057 400002o082
1100 
FR A/C
058 2607F 00000 058 36IJ826IKJ
1101 
FR SUR
059 2607F 00000 059 4000026167
1110 
FR SUB
05K 2607F 00000 05K 410002616K
1111
FR OTHER
05S 2607F 00000 05S 3607F26080
2- The program can he altered so as to ignore all clear picture 
data, hut to recognize a subsequent intervention. Thus the computer 
can he put into a "stopped” stand-by condition and released at will 
in a manner similar to Intervention Modes 9, K, S, N, J, F, L. Using 
these modes the release is obtained by actuating a switch ("Black 
Switch") on the remotely located ILLIAC; using the following the 
release is obtained at the Intervention Rack:
To Place ILLIAC in stand-by condition:
Address: 042
Word: 2607F 00000
To Release ILLIAC:
Address: 042
Word: 81008 40003
3- The program can be altered so that no attempt is made to 
vector Friend Aircraft away from Avoidees. No Avoidee Vectors will 
be sent to the Friend Aircraft.
To neglect presence of Avoidees:
Address: 1J9
Word: 26lFS 00000
To take Avoidees into account:
Address: 1J9
Word: L5258 421F0
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The program can be altered so as to neglect any one of the 
four possible weapon types provided by the system. Then no assign­
ment will ever be made to a weapon of this type.
Type of To Ignore the Weapon To Use the Weapon
Weapon Address Word Address Word
Planes in 
the Air
20J 2621K00000 20J L51F8i+017S
Planes on 
the deck
2 k2 222^+800000 2 k2 L5011L0038
Talos 17F FO2763619I+ 17F F0276361K3
Guns 183 2219700000 183 L5016L0036
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Part C. Insertion of Parameters and Data into the ILLIAC Memory Storage 
Banks using Intervention Mode 8 (see Part A above) (All numbers 
are expressed sexadecimally)
1- The Control Parameters stored in the Control Parameter Bank 
at S3 may be changed one by one by executing Intervention Mode 8.
The appropriate 3 sexadecimal digit address for each parameter is given 
in the Control Parameter Table of Appendix III. The 10 sexadecimal 
digit word expressing the altered parameter must be constructed in 
accordance -with the definitions given there.
2- Removal of an Avoidee from the Avoidee Banks. Tbis operation is 
normally carried out via a manual input to TASCIN. In one possible case 
the Avoidee must be manually removed from the ILLIAC Avoidee Storage Banks. 
If a Bogey is assigned to TAL0S, its track becomes an Avoidee Track (class 
digits 0011) and it is also inserted into the Avoidee Banks. If the 
control personnel wish to abort this assignment, a manual input to TASCIN 
must be used to change the appropriate Avoidee’s class digits back to the 
proper Bogey class. Any other necessary change in the status digits should 
also be made (see Appendix II) (e.g. a manual assignment made,, although 
ILLIAC can be allowed to try for a second assignment). If this process
is carried out on a TALOS Avoidee (S^ = 1, S2 = l), whose Avoidee Number 
A^ (in the ATN digits) lies between 1 and 6, a manual intervention must 
be used to remove the Avoidee from the Avoidee Banks:
Address: 2NS + A^
Word: LLLLL LLLLL
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3- Any general change can be made in the Banks 1 and 2 Words of 
any operational object, if it be desired to change the operational 
characteristics of the object with the ATN corresponding thereto. 
Mission Bank 1 Access:
Address: 300 + ATN
Word: x± Xg x^ x^ x^ x? xQ x^ x1Q
Mission Bank 2 Access:
Address: 3^0 + ATN
Word: x1 xg x^ x^ x^ xg x^ xQ x^ x1Q
The sexadecimal digits x^ must be chosen to achieve the desired ends 
in the light of the definitions of them for the various types of 
operational objects given in the body of the report. Specific cases 
will be given below. It should be noted that the coordinates of a 
mission point which may be stored in Banks 1 and 2 and which are not 
known by the operator may be destroyed in these interventions. This 
is not serious since these coordinates will be automatically restored 
to the Banks 1 and 2 by the control program on the next appearance of 
the mission on the clear picture.
Removal of "on-vectorn mark for Friend Surface, Friend Sub­
surface, Surface Friend Other, Carrier, Surface Protectee. Such 
objects will be initially set to "do-not-vector". A subsequent 
assignment will automatically place them "on-vector". Only if it is 
subsequently desired to place them on "do-not-vector" need this 
intervention into Mission Bank 2 be executed:
Address: 380 + ATN
Word: 00000 00300
C O N F I D E N T I A L
88-122 C O N F I D E N T I A L
5- To change arament type of a Friend Surface, Carrier, or Surface 
Protectee execute intervention into Mission Bank 1:
Address : 300 + ATN
Word: 00000 00000 x 0
in binary: x10 = 0000 Unarmed
iioxH 0001 Guns
IIokh 0010 }
) TALOS
0011 Ji
Notes: To set = 0000 is the only way to keep a Surface Protectee
from Being tested for Gun Weapons Assignment.
The armament settings above on Carrier will have the effects 
discussed in Chapter II, Section H.
6- To insert additional Carrier Plane ATN’s into the Carrier 
Plane Bank.
Address: 2F3 + (ATN of Carrier)
Word: x^ x^ x^ x^ x^ x^ x^. Xq x^
where: x^ x^ = ATN of Carrier Plane 1st to be launched
x-, Xt = ATN of Carrier Plane 2nd to be launched3
x,_ X/: = ATN of Carrier Plane 3**d to be launched
5 8
X j Xq = ATN of Carrier Plane tai to be launched
xn xir= ATN of Carrier Plane 5th to be launched-LU
7- To remove a Protectee or a Protectee Carrier from the ILLIAC 
Protectee Banks if it is changed in TASC to a non-Protectee object:
Address: 2LS + (ATN of Protectee)
Word: 80000 00000
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8- To put an Aircraft Protectee on "steer":
Address: 300 + (ATN of Protectee)
Word: 00000 LL Xg x1Q
where in binary : Xg x^ x^Q = 00 a^ a^ a^ a^ a^ a^ a^ ag a^ a1Q 
and where a2 ... a1Q express the decimal number
7^7 + (ATN of Carrier to which steered)
in binary notation.
9- To place Friend Aircraft or Aircraft Protectee on CARRIER 
CAP about home carrier:
Address : 300 + ATN
Word: 00000 LOOOx,10
where: x1Q = ATN of home carrier.
Note: Only necessary after object has previously been on
"steer", or if object is being changed to CARRIER CAP.
10- Tto place Friend Aircraft or Aircraft Protectee on GEOREF 
CAP (two interventions necessary):
Address: 300 + ATN
Word: 00 x^ x^ x5 0000 x10
and:
Address : 3Ö0 + ATN
Word: 00 y^ y^ y^ y6 y? y8 oo
where: x, x, -x,_ = 00 v w w v v w  0 (12 binary digits)0 ^ y v'----— — '
x „  in miles (binary) GR
x1Q = ATN of home carrier 
y^ y^ y_ = 00 yvvvvyvvv^Q
Y in miles (binary) GR
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y^ y yg = v y r w w w  00
Jp ,
6 fuel units consumed/mile (binary)
Note: This intervention is necessary for Friend Aircraft only if it
has previously been on an intercept mission. It is necessary 
for both Friend Aircraft and Aircraft Protectee if they are 
being changed from CARRIER to GEOREF CAP.
11- Georef coordinates are inserted into the Mission Banks 1 and 
2 of any Aircraft Friend Other (or any other operational object for 
which this may be desired) by using the positional portions of the 
rules given in step 10 above.
12- To insert ATN of home carrier into a Friend Aircraft's 
Mission Bank 1 word:
Address: 300 + (ATN of Friend Aircraft)
Word: x., ^
where: x ^  = ATN of home carrier and where the other nine digits are
to be consistent with the rules pertaining to the information carried 
in these digits.
13- To prevent any Friend Aircraft from ever getting a weapons 
assign, set g = fuel units consumed/mile in Mission Bank 2 word to the 
maximum possible value, g = 3 + 255/256 fuel units consumed/mile:
Address: 380 + ATN
Word: 00000 LLN00
i k - In case a large number of the above described words need to 
be inserted into ILLIAC at one time during operation, the word-by­
word insertion via Intervention Mode 8 would be inefficient and time
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consuming. ILLIAC should he stopped using one of Intervention Modes 
9-L. The ILLIAC input should he switched to a tape reader and a 
miniature bootstrap inserted as explained in Section M of R-7^ using 
the white "Execute Switch" and the "Counter Reset" and "R^ Set" 
buttons. The words to he inserted should he placed on the tape following 
the Miniature Bootstrap and should consist of a list of 5 sexadecimal 
digit insertion addresses each followed by the 10 sexadecimal digit 
word to he inserted. This tape should he terminated by 
000 2 6 okO 00000 000
which will automatically restart ILLIAC at the proper place in the Main 
Read Routine -
000 2^040 00000 000
can he used, in which case ILLIAC will restart only after the "Black 
Switch" is actuated.
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